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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of interdicting components of an adversary's system,
e.g., a war-time economy, a transportation network, etc. Basic techniques are
developed and illustrated with a simple network interdiction problem, "maximizing
the shortest path" (MXSP). In MXSP, an interdictor wishes to employ limited
interdiction resources as effectively as possible to slow an adversary in moving
between two network nodes. "Interdiction" destroys a network arc entirely or
increases its effective length through an attack. This bi-level, max-min problem is
formulated as a mixed-integer program (MIP), but unique decomposition
algorithms are developed to solve the problem more efficiently than standard
branch and bound. One algorithm is essentially Benders decomposition with
special integrality cuts for the master problem. A second algorithm uses a new set-
covering master problem, and a third is a hybrid of the first two. We extend our
techniques (/') to solve general system-interdiction problems, some of which cannot
be formulated as MIPs, (//') to solve system-defense problems where critical system
components must be identified and hardened against interdiction, and (Hi) to solve
interdiction problems with uncertain interdiction success. We report
computational experience for MXSP, a shortest-path network-defense problem
and MXSP with uncertain interdiction success.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This doctoral dissertation investigates what we call "The System Interdiction
Problem," (SI), and "The System Defense Problem," (SD). In SI, an "adversary" tries to
maximize the utility of his system (modeled as general linear or integer programs), and
an "interdictor," with limited assets, tries to minimize that maximum by limiting the
adversary's feasible actions, or by increasing the cost associated with his activities. As in
a zero-sum Static Stackelberg Game (see Simaan and Cruz, 1973, for the definition of
Stackelberg strategy), we assume that the interdictor {leader) first chooses his actions and
only after that the adversary {follower) decides how to operate the system, as best
possible, given the effects of the interdiction. SD extends that methodology to plan
effective "hardening" (defense) of a system to minimize the effects of subsequent
interdiction. In SD, the players change sides: The leader is the system user who first
chooses his defense actions and only then the interdictor, now the follower, chooses his
interdiction plan.
Throughout this work, we have a special interest in the problem of interdicting (or
defending) a road or other transportation network in order to maximize the post-
interdiction shortest-path length between two specified nodes. In this problem, a
"network user" wishes to traverse a path of minimum length (or minimum time,
minimum cost, etc.) between two specified nodes, 5 and /, in a directed network. But, by
first attacking the network using limited resources, an interdictor can destroy certain arcs,
or increase the effective length of certain arcs, and thereby increase the minimum length
in the a priori network.
(a) Maximizing the Shortest Path (MXSP) is the interdictor's max-min problem:
Subject to a limited interdiction budget, interdict arcs in a network so as to
maximize the shortest-path length between nodes s and t.
(b) Defending the Shortest Path (DSP) is the network user's min-max-min problem:
Subject to a limited defense budget, harden arcs against interdiction so as to
minimize the post-interdiction shortest path, given that the interdictor will
optimize his interdiction plan with knowledge of which arcs are hardened.
Hardened arcs are assumed invulnerable.
In the rest of this chapter, we formulate SI and SD as mathematical programming
problems, and motivate some new approaches for solving those problems.
A. SYSTEM INTERDICTION
The system interdiction problem is a generalization of network interdiction
problems, which have received considerable attention over the years. First were the
military applications, like interdiction of ground-forces transportation (e.g., Ghare,
Montgomery and Turner 1971, McMasters and Mustin 1970, Golden 1978, Fulkerson
and Harding 1977), and lately drug interdiction efforts have triggered more research (e.g.,
Wood 1993, Washburn and Wood 1994). Today, military and civilian systems are
becoming even more complicated and interdependent, so interest in interdiction of
"general systems" arises, too (Chern and Lin 1995).
The system interdiction problem is a model for the following scenario: Two
opposing forces, a leader (interdictor) and a follower (adversary), are involved in a
warlike conflict. We assume that the follower operates a "system," with its optimal
operation represented adequately by the solution to a linear program. (Later we extend
our results to interdiction of systems represented by more general optimization
problems.) Thus, the follower's problem, with no interdiction, is simply
max{cry|/ly<b,0<y<u}where c,y,ue$R", b E^Hm ,A eWm * n and c r is the
transpose of the column vector c (we assume that the follower's problem is feasible). On
the other hand, the interdictor tries to minimize the follower's objective value by
preventing the use of some of the follower's possible activities, indexed byy. Let the
feasible set for the leader be X = |x e{0,l}n |/?x < r|. Xj =1 means that activity j is
interdicted and Rx < r represents the restrictions on interdiction resources (we assume
thatX is not empty).
The system interdiction problem finds the optimal interdiction strategy x* for the
leader. The optimal solution for the follower given x*, denoted by y*, is not particularly
important. Two special instances of SI are:
(a) Interdiction of a max-flow network system (e.g., Ghare, Montgomery and Turner
1971, Wood 1993) is a situation where the follower maximizes flow through a
capacitated network, while the leader, with limited interdiction resources, can
break some of the network's arcs (a broken arc has no capacity), and
(b) The k-most-vital-arcs problem (Corely and Shaw 1982, Malik et al. 1989) is a
special case of MXSP where the interdictor seeks to destroy exactly k arcs to
interdict the network most effectively.
Let U - diag(u). Then, The Linear System-Interdiction Problem (LSIP) is defined
to be the following leader's problem:
[LSIP] min max cry
xeX yeF(x)
where X = {x e {0,1}" Rx < rj, and
7(x) = {y|Ay<b, 0<y<*7(l-x)}
The follower uses activity j at level yy By interdicting activity j, the leader changes the
upper bound on yj from Uj to 0, i.e., forces the follower to accept j, =0 (we assume that
7(x) is not empty for all feasible xgX).
Remark: In Appendix B we show that [LSIP] is equivalent to a more general system
interdiction problem where Y(x) = {y\Ay + Bx < b} and where the leader can change the
cost of the follower's activities as well. This general case allows any single interdiction
by the leader to affect one or more of the follower's possible activities and available
resources. For instance, in MXSP, one interdiction attempt might increase the length of
several arcs and/or delete one or more nodes from the network.
Formulation [LSIP] is a structured case of the Bi-Level Mixed Integer
Programming Problem (BLMlP). (See Ben-Ayed 1993 for an introduction to BLMIPs.)
However, the general BLMIP does not assume a max-min conflict as in LSIP, and the
objective functions of the leader and the follower may have much in common in the
BLMIP, rather than being in direct opposition. For instance, the leader and follower may
represent two levels of decision makers in the same company, and therefore they have
similar, although not identical, goals.
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In Appendix A existing algorithms for BLMTPs are explored, and it is shown that
none of those algorithms is appropriate for large instances of LSIP. Some of the
algorithms (Bard and Moore 1992, Wen and Yang 1990) use a positive approach, which
means that they work better when there is strong correlation between the leader's and
follower's objective functions. Such algorithms are likely to be inefficient when applied
to max-min problems such as LSEP. Two other BLMTP algorithms (Moore and Bard
1990, Vicente et al. 1996) may not be directly positive, but they rely on solving bi-level
linear programs (BLLPs) which are nominally solved using a positive approach. In fact,
only three exact algorithms for BLLPs have been tested on relatively large problems
(Bard and Moore 1990, Hansen et al. 1992, Judice and Faustino 1992), and all of these
algorithms use a positive approach. A few exact algorithms (Vaish and Shetty 1977,
Anandalingam and Apprey 1991, Onal, 1993) use what appears to be a non-positive
approach, but none of these algorithms have been tested on large problems. Finally, we
note that no extant algorithm in the bi-level arena, exact or heuristic, is designed to take
advantage of the special max-min structure of LSIP, or the special shortest-path structure
ofMXSP.
B. REFORMULATION
Formulation [LSIP] is difficult to solve, as we shall see, and a reformulation is
needed. In order to see the difficulties with [LSIP], notice first that being able to solve
[LSIP] when x is continuous would be useful, because:
(a) We would be able to use a branch-and-bound procedure to solve [LSIP].
(b) The relaxed problem has a solution at an extreme point of the convex hull of X,
C(X) (Bazaraa, et. al., 1993). Hence, ifwe relax the binary constraints x e {0,1}"
so that < x < 1 , and all the extreme points of C(X) happen to be in X, then we
can relax the binary constraints and still be guaranteed an optimal (binary)
solution. For instance, this would be the case whenX= { x e {0,1}" , lx< ro) ).
However, solving the relaxed problem isn't easy in general. Let
fi(x) = max c y so that formulation [LSIP] is equivalent to min £ (x) . When we relax
the binary constraints mX, /x (x) is a concave function, because the choice of x changes
only the right-hand side of the follower's LP. Hence, we may have local optima. In fact,
the problem [LSIP] is extremely difficult to solve and even the relaxed problem is
strongly NP-hard (Hansen, Jaumard and Savard 1992).
Example 1.1
To illustrate the "bad behavior" of the relaxation of [LSIP], let the follower's
problem be represented by:
[EX1] max
y
y\ + yi
s.t. y\
yi
<5
<5
y\ - y-i <4
-y\ + yi <3
y\ >0, y2 >o,
The system's value (without any interdiction) is 10. Assume that the leader can interdict
either y\ or y-i, of course, he wishes to minimize the maximum value of yl + y2 after
interdiction. If the leader interdicts y\, the follower solves
[EXla] max
y
y\ + yi
St. y\
yi
<o
<5
y\ - y* <4
-y\ + yi <3
y\ > o, y2 >o,
and hence obtains a value of 3. In the same way, if the leader interdicts y2 , the value of
the system is 4. In this simple example, the optimal solution for the leader is to interdict
y\. Now, let's see what happens when we relax the binary constraint on the interdiction
variables. Let y\ be interdicted by 1 - p and y2 be interdicted by p, < p < 1 . The
parametric problem the leader solves is:
[EXlb] min /j(p)
0<^<l
where fx{p) = max y\ + y2
y
s.t. yi <5p
yi < 5(1-/?)
y\ - yi <4
- yi + y2 <3
y\ ^0, y2 >o,
and fi(p) has a global minimum at p = and a local minimum at p = 1 . (See Figure
1.1.)
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Figure 1.1: The value of the system of Example 1.1 as a function of
p, as given by formulation [EX lb].
As we expect, f(p) in Example 1.1 is a concave function, which is not easy to
minimize. In order to overcome this problem, we reformulate the system-interdiction
problem. The idea is to leave the feasible region of the follower independent of x and,
instead, add a penalty term in the follower's objective function for any use of interdicted
activities. The new formulation is convex, for continuous x, and a local optimum is a
global optimum, too.
We prove in Chapter HI that there exists a finite penalty multiplier v * , such that
for all v > v * the following is equivalent to formulation [LSIP]:
[LSIP-1] min max cry-xrVy
xeX yeY
where X = {x e {0,1}"
|
Rx < r]
Y = [y | Ay < b, < y < u}, and
V = diag(vl).
8-
T T
Let /2 (x) = max{c y - x Vy} so that [LSIP-1] is equivalent to min/2 (x) . The
yeY
'
xeX
equivalence of formulations [LSIP] and [LSIP-1] means that /2 (x) = f^x) for all x eX,
and so if y(x) Gargmax{c7y-xrFy}, then x rVy = xry = and /2 (x) = c ry(x) is not
actually a function of v.
Notice that when we relax the binary constraints in X, f2 (x) is a convex function,
and that the feasible region of the follower's problem is independent of the interdiction
plan. More importantly, from basic linear programming theory we can reformulate
[LSIP-1] to min{z \z >cry-x rVy Vy eY'} where Y' is the set of extreme points of
y={y|y4y<b, 0<y<u}. This suggests solving [LSIP-1] with a row generation
algorithm, which is essentially Benders Decomposition (Benders 1962). In this
algorithm, the inner minimization is a subproblem that generates extreme points of Y.
The master problem is a relaxation of [LSIP-1] that approximates f{s), from below, with
cuts constructed from those extreme points. Actually, this algorithm has already been
developed and applied to the max-flow network-interdiction problem (Cormican 1995).
Given an interdiction plan x and the solution y(x) of the associated subproblem,
the new cut in the master problem, z > c y(x) - x Vy(x), will be "reasonably tight," i.e.,
will give a good approximation of f2 (x) for xgI,i^ £,if we have a valid, but small,
penalty multiplier v. For instance, in the max-flow network interdiction case v = 1 is
always valid and gives tight cuts. However, in another system-interdiction problem, the
minimum valid value of v could be difficult to calculate. A "large enough" penalty can
be easy to define
—
/
2 (0) will work for some problems—but such a penalty can be much
larger than necessary. On the other hand, if we guess and we guess too low, we might
terminate with an incorrect solution and not know it (see Example 3.1 in Chapter ID). If
we guess and we guess too high, the running time of the decomposition algorithm will be
excessive, due to the loose cuts.
The Benders decomposition algorithm is discussed in detail in Chapter II (for the
MXSP scenario) and in Chapter HI (for more general system-interdiction problems).
We also develop a second decomposition algorithm, which is a variant of the Benders
decomposition that assumes no bound on the penalty multiplier v in [LSIP-1], and
describe a hybrid decomposition algorithm that is a combination of the first two. The
second and third algorithms appear to be superior to the first for MXSP.
Example 1.1 (revisited)
We can reformulate Example 1.1 in the form of [LSIP-1] and obtain an
equivalent (for p = and p = l), but convex formulation. We'll do so with two
penalties, v = 2 and v = 10, to show the difficulties that a large penalty may cause. When
we relax the binary constraints, the corresponding parametric linear program is:
[EXlc] min f2 {p)
0<p<l
where f2 (p) = max yi + y2 - v ((l-p) vi + py2 )
y
s.t. yi < 5
yi <5
yi - y2 <4
- y\ + yi ^3
yx >0, y2 >0.
As can be seen in Figure 1.2, for both values of v the solution of the inner
10
maximization problem, as a function ofp, is convex and matches f2 (p) for p - and
p - 1 . However, for v = 10, the relaxation is much less useful. Assume we start the
decomposition algorithm we mentioned earlier, with p - . The two cuts the
subproblem would produce, for v - 2 and v = 10, are shown in the graph. The cut using
v = 2 gives a tighter bound on f2 (p) for p = 1 and clearly that difference will become
more significant in more realistic and multi-dimensional problems.
flip), fliP)
fl(P)
Relaxation of
formulation [LSIP-1]
v = 2 v = 10
flip)
Relaxation of
formulation [LSIP]
.33 .86
The first cut in the
master problem for »
10 v = 2
Figure 1.2: Relaxation of different formulations for Example 1.1. The
relaxation using formulation [LSIP] is concave while the relaxation using
formulation [LSIP-1] is convex. When solving formulation [LSIP-1] with
Benders decomposition, the cuts in the master problem are tighter for v = 2
compared to v = 10.
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C. SYSTEM DEFENSE
The system-defense problem is a natural extension of the system-interdiction
problem. When a system user expects his system to be interdicted, he may wish to
expend resources to protect that system to mitigate against the effects of interdiction.
The question SD addresses is: How should a system user (now also called the
"defender"), with limited resources, "harden" the components of his system to best
protect against interdiction, given that the interdictor will optimize his interdiction plan
with knowledge ofthose improvements?
Let the set of feasible defense plans for the system user be given by
G = {ge{0,l}n |Hg<h} (we assume that G is not empty). We assume absolute
protection so that gk = 1 implies that activity j is fully secured against interdiction. SD
finds the optimal interdiction strategy for the system user, g*, and the value of the system
associated with this defense plan. Formally, the Linear System-Defense Problem (LSDP)
is defined as the following problem for the system user:
[LSDP] max min max cry
geG xeX(g) yey(x)
where G = {g e {0,1}n | Hg < h}
,
X(g) =[xe{0,l}n |/ts<r,0<x<l-g}, and
Y(x) = {y\Ay<b, < y < £7(1 - x)}.
[LSDP] can be viewed as a min-max linear system-interdiction problem where the
system user is the leader, the interdictor is the follower, and for every feasible defense
plan g, the associated value of the system is given by a solution to a system-interdiction
12-
problem where the protected activities are invulnerable (however we assume that X(g) is
not empty for all geG). Thus, in SD the leader interdicts the interdictor. Notice that a
linear program can no longer represent "the system." However, when the defended
system is represented by a linear program (as in our formulation of [LSDP]), we can
solve the overall system-defense problem through a nested decomposition algorithm,
using one or more of the decomposition algorithms developed for [LSIP.]
Example 1.1 (revisited)
Assuming that the system user can protect one of his activities, vi or y>2, it is clear
that he should protect y\. However, in more complicated problems, devising the optimal
defense plan is much more difficult, and actually the system defense problem is NP-hard
and not known to be in NP.
D. OUTLINE
In this introduction, we have defined the system-interdiction problem, which is a
difficult-to-solve bi-level mixed-integer programming problem. The continuous
relaxation of the first formulation we gave for LSIP is a concave function in the
interdiction variables, so even the relaxed problem is difficult to solve. Therefore, we
introduced a second formulation of SI that is equivalent to the first for binary interdiction
decisions, but is convex when we relax those binary constraints. The second formulation
uses a penalty term in the objective function that prevents the follower from using
interdicted activities. Unfortunately, this formulation may not be useful if a valid,
sufficiently small penalty multiplier, is hard to find.
In Chapter II we develop three decomposition algorithms for solving the
problem ofMaximizing the Shortest Path (MXSP) in a directed network. Computational
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results for those three algorithms and an MIP formulation of the problem are provided,
and practical techniques to speed convergence of the decomposition schemes are
described and demonstrated.
In Chapter in, we extend the models and methodology of Chapter II to solve
interdiction problems defined on systems modeled as general linear or integer programs,
not just networks. We use:
(a) A decomposition algorithm that is based on a finite and "good" penalty multiplier,
(b) A decomposition algorithm that assumes no finite bound on the multiplier, or
(c) A decomposition algorithm that is a hybrid of first two.
In Chapter IV, we discuss the system-defense problem, and solve it using a
nested decomposition algorithm. Throughout the Chapter, we use the problem of
Defending the Shortest Path (DSP) as an illustrative example, but the approach and
development is valid for general SD as well. Computational results for DSP are given,
and practical techniques to speed convergence of the nested decomposition schemes are
demonstrated.
Finally, Chapter V extends our approaches further, to one example of "stochastic
system interdiction," a case where interdiction successes are uncertain. As expected, this
problem is harder to solve and so we suggest several approximation algorithms that are
based on the three decomposition algorithms developed earlier. Preliminary
computational experience is reported for a stochastic shortest-path network-interdiction
problem, but the suggested algorithms can be used for other stochastic system
interdiction problems, too.
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H. SHORTEST-PATH NETWORK INTERDICTION
Network-interdiction problems involve two opposing forces, a leader and a
follower, who are engaged in a warlike conflict. The follower operates a network so as to
optimize his objective function which involves moving a supply convoy through the
network as quickly as possible, or maximizing the amount of materiel transported
through the network subject to capacity constraints, etc. The interdictor tries to restrict
the follower's achievable objective value by interdicting (attacking) arcs so as to destroy
those arcs entirely, or increase their effective length, reduce their capacity, etc. The
purpose of this chapter is to develop new models and solution methods for the problem of
interdicting a road or other transportation network in order to maximize the (post-
interdiction) shortest-path length between two specified nodes.
The topic of network interdiction has received some attention over the years,
initially with military applications. For instance, McMasters and Mustin (1970) and
Ghare et al. (1971) develop methods for interdicting a capacitated supply network to
hinder the movements of enemy troops and materiel. More recently, research was
triggered by drug interdiction efforts (Wood 1993, Washburn and Wood 1994) and by the
need to assess the vulnerability of information networks to interdiction (Grotschel et al.
1992, Medhi 1994).
The network-interdiction problem we focus on is Maximizing the Shortest Path
(MXSP) (Fulkerson and Harding 1977, Golden 1978). In this problem, a "network user,"
i.e., the follower, wishes to traverse a path of minimum length (or minimum time,
minimum cost, etc.) between two specified nodes, s and /, in a directed network. But, by
first attacking the network using limited resources, an interdictor, i.e., the leader, can
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destroy certain arcs, or increase the effective length of certain arcs, and thereby increase
that minimum length. MXSP is the interdictor's problem: Subject to a limited
interdiction budget (and possibly other restrictions), interdict arcs in a network so as to
maximize the shortest-path length between nodes s and /.
In our definition ofMXSP, arc interdiction involves a binary decision with known
resource consumption and assured success. The k-most-vital-arcs problem (Corely and
Shaw 1982, Malik et al. 1989) is a special case of MXSP where the interdictor seeks to
destroy exactly k arcs to interdict the network most effectively. Since that problem is
NP-complete (Ball et al. 1989), it follows that MXSP is NP-complete.
The &-most-vital-arcs problem has received limited attention and we are not aware
of effective algorithms for solving it. Malik et al. (1989) suggest a potentially effective
algorithm for the problem, but the algorithm has a theoretical flaw as we discuss in
Section C. Corely and Shaw (1982) suggest an algorithm for the single-most-vital-arc
problem but this problem is a very simple case ofMXSP which is solvable in polynomial
time.
Unlike the £-most-vital-arcs problem, MXSP allows general resource constraints
which, most significantly, enable the modeling of different types of interdiction
resources, e.g., ground troops, aerial sorties, cruise missiles, etc. Fulkerson and Harding
(1977) and Golden (1978) have studied a simpler variant ofMXSP incorporating a single
type of interdiction resource and arc lengths that increase linearly with the amount of
resource applied. We believe that our model with discrete interdiction variables is more
realistic.
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In this chapter, we first show how to model MXSP as a mixed-integer program
(MIP). It is intuitively clear, and later demonstrated by computation, that this MIP can be
very difficult to solve directly using LP-based (linear-programming-based) branch and
bound. Therefore, we devise three decomposition-based algorithms for MXSP and
demonstrate their computational effectiveness. The first algorithm implements a Benders
decomposition (Benders 1962) that solves MXSP much like Cormican (1995) solves a
maximum-flow network-interdiction problem . This technique converges slowly, as does
branch and bound applied to the basic MTP, when interdictions cause large local delays.
The second decomposition algorithm does not suffer as much from this problem. That
decomposition (a) simplifies the master problem of the first algorithm to a set-covering
problem (SCP), (b) improves efficiency by incorporating a greedy heuristic for the SCP
(in addition to using an exact algorithm), and (c) exploits the special structure of shortest-
path problems to gain efficiency. The last algorithm we devise is a hybrid of the first
two.
A. THE BASIC MODEL: MXSP AS A MIXED-INTEGER PROGRAM
The mathematical programming formulation of MXSP on a directed graph
G=(Af,A) is:
Problem: Maximize the shortest-path length in a directed network by
interdicting arcs.
Indices: / e N, nodes in G (s is the source node, t is the sink node),
k e A , arcs in G,
k g FS(i) (k e RS(i)) arcs directed out of (into) node i,
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Data: < Ck < oo, nominal integer length of arc k,
< dk < qo, added integer delay if arc k is interdicted,
r vector of available interdiction resources,
R matrix of interdiction-to-resource conversions,
Variables: Xk = 1 if arc k is interdicted by the leader; else Xk =0,
yic =1 if arc A: is traversed by the follower; else >>£ =0,
Formulation:
[MXSP - P] max min ]T (ck + xkdk )yk
xeX y * e.A
'
JbefS(i) keRS(i)
1 I = J
ieN-s-t
-1 i = f
v^.^0 VA;g^.
where X = {xe {0,1}|vA| /& < r}, and:
(a) Node s is the source node and t is the terminal node,
(b) The set of arcs directed out of node / is denoted "FS(i)" and the set of arcs
directed into node / is denoted "RS(i),"
(c) Xk =1 implies arc k is interdicted; else Xk =0,
(d) Flow-balance constraints (1) in variables y route one unit of flow from s to t; the
inner minimization is a standard shortest-path model with arc lengths Ck + Xk dk,
(e) Ck is the nominal length of arc k and c* + dk is the length of that arc if it is
interdicted; dk is finite and comprises such factors as repair time or the length of a
local detour (the case of dk = °° is dealt with later),
18-
(f) Rx < r is a set of side constraints on interdiction resources; thus, X represents the
set of feasible interdiction plans (we assume thatX is not empty),
(g) All data are assumed integral, and dk, Ck > V k gA,
(h) All solutions will be assumed to be integral since variables x are required to be
integral and extreme points of the inner minimization are well known to be
integral.
To simplify presentation, and without loss of generality, we make the further assumption:
Assumption 2.1: The interdictor has insufficient resources to disconnect sfrom t.
This assumption is innocuous and merely simplifies presentation of our algorithms.
All of the algorithms are easily modified to identify the degenerate case in which s and /
can be disconnected. The extensions of our techniques to handle undirected networks
and/or node interdiction are also straightforward.
If we fix x, take the dual of the inner minimization in [MXSP-P], make a few
simple modifications and then release x, the following MO5 results:
[MXSP-D] z*= max ^t~ ns
X,7t
s. t. tuj - 7i
t
- dkxk <ck \/k = (ij) e A
tt
s
=0
xeX
Note that ns = may be assumed because the inner minimization of MXSP has at least
one redundant flow-balance constraint (as do all network flow models containing a
balance constraint for each node). Also, note that the dual variables % are unconstrained
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in sign and, having reversed their signs compared to the usual convention, we may
interpret 71, as the post-interdiction shortest-path distance from s to /'.
[MXSP-D] is essentially the model explored by Fulkerson and Harding (1977)
and by Golden (1978), except that their variables x are continuous and only a single
resource constraint is allowed. Thus, that model is a simple linear program (LP).
Fulkerson and Harding (1977) suggest solving the dual of that LP which may be
interpreted as a parametric min-cost flow model. This approach does not appear to be
useful when we relax the binary constraints in [MXSP-D] because their model does not
allow any additional constraints such as x < 1.
In theory, we can solve [MXSP-D] using a standard LP-based branch-and-bound
algorithm. However, especially when possible delays dk are large, the LP relaxation of
the model is weak and this results in excessive enumeration and unsatisfactory
computation times. We use a decomposition approach instead.
B. A BASIC DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
Our basic decomposition algorithm to solve MXSP is a direct application of
Benders decomposition to [MXSP-P] (or [MXSP-D] as a MTP, e.g., Garfmkel and
Nemhauser 1972, pp. 135-143). Let y e{0,l}^ denote an arc-path incidence vector
corresponding to an s-t path P, i.e., y^—l implies arc k is in P; otherwise, yk = 0.
z(y)= ^ ckyic ls tne length of the path y. Let Y denote a collection of arc-path
keA
incidence vectors corresponding to a subset of all simple s-t paths in G. For simplicity,
we refer to y as "a path" and Y as "a set of paths." Also, let D = diag(d) and define:
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[Master(f)-l] z$ - max z
1
xeX
s.t. z<cTy + x
TDy Vyef
[SP - Sub(x)] zk = min £ ick + **4t )?*
JfceFS(i) /fcei?S(i)
1 i = s
ieN-s-t
-1 i = /
Let 7 denote the set of all simple s-t paths. For fixed x = £ , a solution to the
inner minimization of [MXSP-P], which is [SP-Sub(x)], always occurs at a path y.
Therefore, [Master(Y)-l] is equivalent to [MXSP-P] when Y = Y. However, we hope to
solve [MXSP-P], at least approximately, by sequentially generating only a small fraction
of the extreme points of 7 in a decomposition algorithm:
Algorithm 1: Basic Benders decomposition algorithm for MXSP.
Input: An instance ofMXSP and allowable optimality gap s.
Output: Interdiction plan x* that solves MXSP to within 8 units of optimality.
Step 0: Y <- 0, z <
—
oo, z <- w, i <- 0.
Step 1: Solve [SP-Sub(x)] for solution y with objective zi .
Y <r-Y uy.
Ifz < zj then x'<— £ and z<r-z%.
Step 2: Solve [Master(7)-1] for solution £ with objective z^
Z <— Zy.
Step 3: If z-z > e then go to Step 1
.
Step 4: x* <— x', print x* and stop.
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The correctness of the algorithm, as in any Benders decomposition algorithm, is
based on the following observations:
(a) The sub-problem (which is simply a shortest-path problem here) finds an optimal
follower's reaction for a specific leader's interdiction plan £. Hence, z$ gives a
lower bound on the leader's optimal solution value. This bound is finite because
ofAssumption 2.1.
(b) If the sub-problem produces the same s-t path twice, the upper bound and the
lower bound must match and the algorithm terminates. If the sub-problem
continues to find new paths, the algorithm must converge in a finite number of
iterations because the number of simple s-t paths is finite. (The number of paths
and thus the number of iterations may be exponential, however.)
(c) When Y includes all simple s-t paths, [Master(7)-1] is clearly equivalent to
[MXSP-P]. Otherwise, when 7c7, [Master(7)-1] is a relaxation of [MXSP-P]
and thus, Zf is an upper bound on the interdictor's optimal objective value. Note:
The master problem constraints defined with respect to Y are called "Benders
cuts."
(d) To tighten the relaxation of [Master(7)-1], we next introduce "integrality cuts."
Proposition 2.1: For every Benders cut z < c7y + x
r
Z)y, the integrality cut xry > 1 is
valid whenever z > c y
.
Proof: Note that each such Benders cut implies that z* < c y + x* Dy. Furthermore,
either x*
r
y = or x*
r
y > 1. If x*
T
y = given that z > c
r
y, then z* < c
r
y + x*
TDy =
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c
r
y + < z, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x*
7
y > 1 which implies that x
r
y > 1 is a
valid integrality cut.
Corollary 2.1: For every Benders cut z < c y + x Dy, the integrality cut of Proposition
7* y*. • 7" a 7* ^ ^ • 7* .a.
2.1, x y > 1, can be tightened to x y > 2 if z > c y + mzx.dkyk , it can be tightened to x y
k
> 3 if z > c y + max { ck yk+ die yv } 5 an^ so forth.
Naturally, as z is updated in the algorithm, we may be able to tighten previously
generated integrality cuts using Corollary 2.1, too. Actually, in our implementation, we
add the cut xry > 1 even if z = c
r
y (or x
r
y > 2 even if z = c
7
y + maxdkyk , etc.). If the
k
optimal solution value exceeds the current value of z, those cuts are valid. But, if those
cuts render the master problem infeasible, the algorithm can be terminated with the
incumbent x' being optimal.
We also improve the effectiveness of Algorithm 1 by not solving the master
problem to optimality. This well-known variant of Benders decomposition (e.g.,
Geoffrion and Graves 1974) is guaranteed to converge as long as every sub-optimal
integer solution y satisfies c
T
y > z (recall that data are integral), and we do not update z
unless the master problem is solved to optimality.
Since all dk are assumed finite, Algorithm 1 does not allow the interdictor to
completely remove (destroy) an arc. To model the effect of complete arc removal, we
can solve the sub-problem with interdicted arcs eliminated, while in the master problem
we may be able to define a "sufficiently large" artificial delay (say \M |max \ck ) on
k
every interdictable arc to keep the Benders cut valid. But, as we shall demonstrate
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empirically, the run time of the algorithm grows very quickly with the size of that delay.
On the other hand, being too conservative with that artificial delay can lead to difficulties
as seen in the following example.
Example 2.1
Consider the network of Figure 2.1 and an interdictor who can remove any two
arcs from that network. One obvious optimal solution to MXSP for this network is to
interdict (s,a) and (s,b) so that the shortest s-t path has length 20. Now, let d denote the
artificial delay that is to be added to interdicted arcs and suppose that we use Algorithm
1, without integrality cuts, to solve this problem.
Initially, the algorithm finds the uninterdicted shortest path s-a-t with length 2.
Given that solution for the follower, the leader interdicts (s,a) and (a,t) and the "upper
bound" (as calculated in Step 2) is 2 + 2d, which is valid only if d > 9. In the next step
the follower finds the shortest path after (s,a) and (a,t) are removed from the network.
The solution is s-b-t, with length 12. The two Benders cuts in the master problem are:
z < 2 + dxsa + dxat from the first iteration, and
z < 12 + dxsb + dxbt from the second iteration.
Figure 2.1: Network to illustrate difficulties with artificial delays. Numbers
next to arcs are lengths.
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There are four cases to consider now:
(a) Ifd < 5, the shortest path from the second iteration has length greater the pseudo-
upper bound from the first iteration. We conclude then that d is too small,
increase it and return to the master problem.
(b) If 5 < d < 10, the master problem objective is 12. Since the lower bound and
pseudo-upper bound match, the algorithm terminates, but with an incorrect
solution. In this case, we see no way to recognize that d is too small without
solving this NP-complete problem: Does there exist a solution to MXSP with
objective value greater than z^l
(c) If 10 < d < 18, the master problem interdicts both paths and has optimal objective
value 2+d. The third iteration of the sub-problem finds the path s-c-t with length
20, which is larger than the current pseudo-upper bound. Again, we conclude that
d is too small, increase it and return to the master problem.
(d) Ifd > 18, the upper bound is valid and the algorithm terminates with the optimal
solution.
C. A SECOND DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
Of course, case (b) of Example 1 is the most disturbing. To overcome this
difficulty, we offer a second decomposition algorithm. This algorithm derives from the
variant of Benders decomposition (mentioned earlier) in which the master problem is
solved for any feasible solution with objective value greater than the current lower bound.
The algorithm iterates until no such solution exists; at that point, the best solution found
must be optimal. For simplicity, we now assume that every interdicted arc is completely
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removed from the network. No loss of generality arises since arcs with finite delay are
easily handled: For any arc k with dk< <*> and nominal length Ck, create two parallel arcs,
k\ and k2 . Arc k\ has length Ck and is interdictable, i.e., "removable." Arc k2 is non-
interdictable and has length ck+dk.
The master problem of the new algorithm simply seeks a feasible solution with
objective greater than the current lower bound, z = maxcry .
[Master(f) - 2a] Find xgI
s.t. z<cTy + x
TDy Vys7
z>z + \
(Note that z > z +1 is sufficient since all data are assumed to be integral.)
Proposition 2.2: For artificial delay d sufficiently large, x isfeasible to [Master(Y)-2a]
ifand only if* interdicts at least one arc in everypath represented by Y
.
Proof: Sufficiency is guaranteed because c y > and d is large enough (we can assume
d > 2+1), and necessity follows because z = maxc y .
yeY
Instead of solving [Master(F)-2a], Proposition 2.2 allows us to solve the
following set covering problem (SCP):
[Master(7) - 2b] Find xg!
s.t. y
rx>l Vyef
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The algorithm we have just established is:
Algorithm 2: A covering decomposition algorithm for MXSP.
Input: An instance ofMXSP.
Output: An optimal interdiction plan x*.
Step 0: Y <r-0,z< qo, z <- oo, £ <-
Step 1: Solve [SP-Sub(i)] for optimal solution y with objective value Zj.
7<-fuy.
Ifz < z$ then x' <- x and z <— z%
.
Step 2: Attempt to solve [Master(Y)-2b] for feasible solution x.
If [Master(Y)-2b] is feasible then go to Step 1.
Step 3: x* <— x', print x* and stop.
Let us add a bit of insight to Algorithm 2. Each time the algorithm reaches Step
1, the network user suggests one new s-t path, the best with respect to the interdictor's
previous plan. Then, in Step 2, the interdictor tries to find a plan that interdicts all the s-t
paths that have been exposed so far, paths represented by Y . This new interdiction plan
may or may not force the network user to traverse a path longer than the current lower
bound. Once the interdictor fails to interdict all the paths in Y, he knows that he cannot
force a shortest-path length that is longer than the longest path in Y. But, this length is
exactly the current value of z, so he concludes that no better interdiction plan than the
incumbent x' exists, and the algorithm terminates.
Algorithm 2 is similar to the algorithm for the £-most-vital-arcs-problem
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suggested by Malik et al. (1989). There, paths with non-decreasing lengths in the
uninterdicted network are enumerated and interdiction is attempted until the / shortest
paths cannot be feasibly interdicted. In our setting, this means that an algorithm that
produces the /^-shortest path in the original network (e.g., Katoh et al., 1982) replaces
Step 1. However, the algorithm in Malik et al. assumes that an interdiction plan that
interdicts the / shortest paths must correspond to a cutset in the sub-network created from
the union of the arcs and nodes from those paths. Consequently, a solution x*
corresponds to a minimum-cardinality cutset, which can be identified by solving a
maximum-flow problem in the sub-network using arc capacities of 1. But, as illustrated
next, the assumption is invalid—the master problem just described is a restriction of the
correct one—and thus that procedure must be viewed as a heuristic.
Example 2.2
Consider the network ofFigure 2.2, with all arcs of length 1, and suppose that the
interdictor can remove any two arcs from the network. Clearly, the optimal interdiction
removes arcs (s,c) and (c,t) and forces a shortest path of length 4. But, deleting two arcs
crossing any cutset leaves a shortest path of length 2 or 3.
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The rest of this section describes several enhancements to Algorithm 2 to
improve efficiency.
When the set X includes only a single resource constraint, say rTx < ro, we can
solve the following master problem in place of [Master(Y)-2b]:
[Master(F) - 2c min rrx
s.t. y rx>l VyeF
xe{0A}W
[Master(7)-2c] is a standard set-covering problem (SCP) and, if it has an optimal
objective value less than or equal to ro, then [Master(7)-2b] is feasible. Of course, we
need not solve [Master(7)-2c] to optimality, but just until rrx < ro, and this suggests the
use of efficient heuristics. We use a version of the simple greedy heuristic for SCPs
discussed by, among others, Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988, pp. 466). Many other
heuristics exist, (e.g., Beasley 1990, Caprara et al. 1996), but this one is easy to
implement and provides more-than-adequate performance on our test problems.
Whenever we need to solve a master problem in Algorithm 2, we run the greedy
heuristic on [Master(7)-2c]. If a feasible solution, x e X, is found, we proceed to Step 1
of the algorithm. If not, only then do we resort to an exact (and slower) branch-and-
bound algorithm.
When solving MXSP, Algorithm 2 typically iterates much faster than Algorithm
1 because the master problems are much easier to solve. This is true even when potential
delays dk are small. On the other hand, Algorithm 2 typically requires more iterations
than Algorithm 1. Another problem with Algorithm 2 is that it incorporates no upper
bound, and thus, it cannot be stopped early with a near-optimal solution. To help
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overcome these two difficulties, we employ a local-search procedure. With this
procedure, we can add more than one path to Y per iteration, and we can often determine
an upper bound on the optimal solution value.
Let z(y) denote the length of path y. The key idea behind the local search is that
any path y with z(y) < z may be introduced into Y without compromising validity of the
algorithm. This is true by definition of the lower bound. There are many ways to find
more than one s-t path per iteration and we use the following procedure: It is well known
that finding the shortest paths from s to all other nodes is not much more difficult than
finding a shortest s-t path, so we first compute the former paths encoded using a standard
"shortest path tree" and "predecessor function" (e.g., Ahuja et al. 1993, pp. 106-107). Let
P(t)=(s, i\, 72, •• Jn, t) be a shortest s-t path and let P(j) be a shortest path to nodey. For
every node im e{/"i, h, ••• , in), and for every arc (J,im) in the network, we build the path
(P(j), im, im+h ••• , inj), represented by its incidence vector y, and calculate the path's
length z(y). Hence, the procedure Local_Search(7) takes a shortest path tree T (derived
from a shortest-path algorithm) as input and returns a list of paths. We omit pseudo-code
for this procedure, and for Procedures Compare and Lift described below, because their
implementations are straightforward given the in-text descriptions.
Every path y returned from Local_Search with z(y) < z is introduced into Y as one
more path to be covered in the master problem. If z(y) > z
,
the path is stored in a special
set Y . Later, after updating z in succeeding iterations, we move any y e Y into Y if
z(y) < z. Based on Theorem 3 below, the paths contained in Y can also be used to
obtain an upper bound z on z* which then allows us to solve for e-optimal solutions.
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Proposition 2.3: Let Y^ be a set ofpaths such that z(y) < z for all y e YI . Then, if
[Master( Y^ )-2b] is infeasible, z* < z .
Proof: If z* > z, we can feasibly interdict all paths y such that z(y) < z . By assumption
we cannot, so z* < z .
So, if we define the set % = fu {y e Y \ z(y) < z + 8 } and [Master(% )-2b] is
infeasible, we know that z* <z + z and the solution £ that yielded z is e-optimal.
Our implementation of Algorithm 2 uses two additional procedures that
empirically speed convergence. The first procedure, Compare(Y), returns all the "non-
dominated paths" in Y . Path yi dominates path y2 if all interdictable arcs in y2 are also
contained in yi, i e ., if every interdiction plan that interdicts yi also interdicts £2.
Essentially, Compare implements one type of test for "row redundancy" in an SCP.
Other redundancy tests are known (e.g., Garfinkel and Nemhauser 1972, pp. 302-304,
Taha 1975, pp. 3 16-332) but this one is easy to implement and has proven to be effective.
The second procedure, Lift(Y, z), uses information about arcs with finite delays to
tighten the SCP formulation. Recall that we replace each arc k with length Ck and finite
delay du with two parallel arcs: Interdictable arc k\ has length Ck and non-interdictable arc
£2 has length Ck + *&. Now, assume that we have a path y in Y, such that y includes arc
k\ and dk + z(y) < z. Then, a path y that is identical to y except that it includes arc k2
instead of k\ is longer, but is still shorter than the lower bound. Hence, y can be
introduced into Y . Actually, this new path dominates y and can replace it, and we have
thereby lifted the valid inequality y x > 1 to y x > 1. (This is, in fact, a "lift" since y <
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y, ykx = 1 and ykl =0; see, for example, Nemhauser and Wolsey 1988, pp. 261-267.) The
procedure Lift(7, z) returns the set of non-dominated paths generated from Y after such
replacements. Notice also that if we accept s-optimal solutions, by Proposition 2.3 we
can introduce y into Y as long as z(y ) = dt + z(y) < z + e. That is done by procedure
Lift(7, z+s), which returns the set ofnon-dominated paths from Y with z(y) <z + z.
Algorithm 2, with all enhancements is outlined below. The actual
implementation reorders certain computations for efficiency's sake.
Algorithm 2E: The covering decomposition of Algorithm 2, enhanced.
Input: An instance ofMXSP and optimality tolerance 8.
Output: An e-optimal interdiction plan x* for MXSP.
Step 0: Y <- 0, Y <- 0, z <- -qo, x <r- 0.
Step 1: Solve [SP-Sub(x)] for shortest path tree T and objective z$. If z < z$
then x'<- £, z <- zit Y <- Lift(7, z + s).
Step 2: Y
+
<r- Y
+
kj Local_Search(7)
r<-{y e Y+
\
z(y) < z + s }, Y
+
<- Y
+
- V.
Y'<r- Lift(r , z + s).
Y<r- Compare(Y u Y').
Step 3: Try to solve [Master(7)-2b] for optimal solution x.
If [Master(7)-2b] is feasible, then go to Step 1.
Step 4: x* <-x', print x* and stop.
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It should be noted that LocaI_Search is also applicable to Algorithm 1. In fact,
an s-t path derived by any means generates a valid Benders cut for this algorithm. A cut
generated from an arbitrary path may be dominated if it contains some non-interdictable
arcs, or if the path contains a cycle. Thus, a procedure analogous to Compare is also
applicable to Algorithm 1. (Lift does not apply.) In practice, we find that Algorithm 1
with these modifications requires fewer iterations, but total solution time increases
because the master problems quickly become large and hard to solve.
D. A HYBRID DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
The final algorithm we suggest is a hybrid decomposition algorithm that
combines the master problems of Algorithms 1 and 2. In this hybrid algorithm,
Algorithm 3, we view the master problem of Algorithm 1 as the "basic master problem"
and let master problem constraints of Algorithm 2 serve as integrality cuts for the basic
master problem. Thus, the master problem of Algorithm 3 integrates the Benders cuts,
the integrality cuts of Algorithm 1 and the covering cuts of Algorithm 2. In every
iteration we add to the basic master problem one Benders cut, one integrality cut, and we
update the set of covering constraints in this master problem using procedures
LocaI_Search, Compare and Lift.
Example 2.3
Consider a network containing s-t paths P\ and P2, among others: Pi traverses arcs
1, 2 and 3 and /^traverses arcs 1, 4 and 5. Those arcs have the following parameters: C\ =
3, C2 = 1, C3 = 8, C4 = 4, C5 = 6, d\ =3, di = 4, d^ = 5, d4 = 1, and d5 = 3. Suppose that P\ is
the shortest s-t path in the network, and hence is returned by the sub-problem in the first
iteration of the decomposition algorithm. Then, the Benders cut we add to the master
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problem is:
Bendersi: z < 12 + 3xi + 4x2 + 5x3.
The integrality cut and the covering constraint associated with this Benders cut
are identical:
Integrality 1 : x\ + x2 + X3 > 1
,
Coveringi : X\ + X2 + £3 > 1,
both with "score" 12. (Additional cuts that might be generated by Local_Search are
ignored.) The score is the uninterdicted length of Pi; this value is important for later
tightening or lifting of these cuts. Note that Compare will not eliminate one of these
constraints, nor would we want it to: A lifted integrality cut is different than a tightened
covering constraint even though the base constraints are identical.
Suppose that the interdictor has enough resource(s) to interdict arcs 1, 2 and 3
together, and this is the solution (with z=24) of the first master problem, which consists
of Bendersi, Integrality 1 and Coveringi. Further, assume that the shortest s-t path given
these interdictions is P2 so that z = c\ + d\ + c4 + c$ = 16. In this case we can lift the
previous covering cut because interdiction of arc 1 alone cannot "push" z over the lower
bound z. (Formally, the difference between the score of Coveringi and z exceeds d\.) The
cuts from the first iteration are now:
Bendersi: z < 12 + 3x\ + 4x2 + 5x3,
Integrality 1: x\ + X2 + x$ > 1, Score = 12,
Coveringi: x2 +X3> 1, Score =15.
The score of Coveringi has been updated to 15, which is the length of Pi with arc 1
interdicted. (Note that we could also have lifted the basic covering cut to Xi + X3 > 1, with
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score 16. In our implementation, however, we are satisfied with the first valid lift that we
find.)
The cuts from the second iteration are:
Benders2: z <\3 + 3xi+ lx4 + 3*5,
Integrality2 : x\ + x4 + x5 > 1, Score =13,
Covering2: x4 + X5 > 1, Score =16.
(Again, we ignore covering cuts potentially derived from LocaI_Search.) The score of
Integrality2 is the uninterdicted length ofP2 while the score of Covering2 is the length of
P2 with arc 1 (only) interdicted. Now, suppose that the solution to the new master
problem, which consists of the two Benders, two integrality and two covering cuts, is
X]= x3 = x4 = x5 = 1 and x2 = 0. Thus, z=20 and the algorithm continues.
Suppose then, at some later iteration, z increases to 17. In this case, we can
tighten the right-hand side of Integralityi to 2, because to push z over z we must interdict
at least two of the three arcs in Pi. (Formally, the difference between z and the score of
Integralityi exceeds max^p <&.) We can also lift the second covering cut, because
interdiction of arc 4 alone cannot push z over z — 17. The cuts from the first two
iterations are now:
Bendersi: z < 12 + 3xi + 4x2 + 5x3,
Integralityi: xi+x2 + x3 > 2, Score = 12,
Coverings x2 + x3 > 1, Score = 15,
Benders2: z < 16 + 3*i + 1*4 + 3*5,
Integrality2: *i + x4 + x5 > 1, Score = 16,
Covering2: X5 > 1, Score =17.
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The algorithm may or may not halt now depending on the other cuts that have
been generated and the value of z obtained after solving the current master problem.
In practice, when using a single interdiction resource constraint, we do not use
Benders cuts in early iterations. Instead, we heuristically solve the set-covering master
problem of Algorithm 2 to suggest a new interdiction plan, as long as this is easy to do.
Once the covering problem becomes difficult, or when we want to establish or update an
upper bound, we solve the complete, hybrid master problem. If the problem is infeasible,
or the value of the objective function (the new value of upper bound) matches the value
of the lower bound, we are done. Otherwise, we proceed with the algorithm using the
solution from the hybrid master problem.
E. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE
We use a set ofrandom problems here to test the algorithms we have constructed.
Several network structures are used, specified as follows:
(a) There is one source node 5 and one sink node t.
(b) There are mxn "inner nodes," arranged in a grid ofm rows and n columns.
(c) There is an arc from s to all (inner) nodes in the first column, and there is an arc
from all (inner) nodes in the last column to t. None of these 2m arcs may be
interdicted.
(d) An arc exists from each node in row r and column c, i.e., in grid position (r,c) to
the nodes in positions (r+l,c), (r-l,c), (r,c+l), (r+\,c+l) and (r-l,c+l), assuming
that nodes exist in these positions. All of these arcs are interdictable. Figure 2.3
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gives an example of a test network with 9 = 3x3 inner nodes,
(e) The basic data for each network is:
1) m and n,
2) the identity of interdictable arcs: the total number of potentially
interdictable arcs is a = (n - 2)(5/w - 4) + 3/w - 2, but only a specified
percentagep of the a arcs are chosen to be interdictable. Interdictable arcs
are chosen at random; and
3) ro, the total interdiction resource available. (We assume single type of
interdiction resource.)
Cannot be interdicted
- Potentially interdictable
Figure 2.3: Example of a 3x3 network for computational tests.
(f) The randomly generated, integer data for arc k are:
1) Ck, uniformly distributed on [\,c],
2) when k is identified as interdictable: dk, uniformly distributed on [\,d],
and
3) when k is identified as interdictable: rk, uniformly distributed on [!,/•].
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Our algorithms are programmed in C using the CPLEX version 5.0 callable
library (ILOG 1997) for exact solution of master problems, when needed. CPLEX is also
used to solve [MXSP-D] directly. Default solver options are used except that "variable
selection strategy" is set to "branch based on pseudo reduced cost" when solving the
master problem in any of the decomposition algorithms. All computation is performed
on an IBM RS-6000 model 590 computer with 512 megabytes of RAM. All running
times displayed are averages across ten networks of identical topology, but with different
random arc attributes.
Note that in Algorithms 1 and 3, we do not solve the master problem to
optimality, but rather for a feasible integer solution £ that yields z > z. Experience
indicates that, when the master problem becomes difficult, it is best to stop with the first
such incumbent solution. On the other hand, the first incumbent does not usually
generate a "good" cut in early iterations. Our implementation exploits this experience
using a simple rule: If we have not solved the master problem to optimality in three
seconds, we stop if the incumbent has z > z, or else we continue until we find such an
incumbent or until the master problem is proven infeasible.
Table 1 shows results for problems 1-4. Overall, Algorithm 3 has the best
running times and can be 40 times faster than solving [MXSP-D] directly by branch and
bound. Algorithm 2 is fastest for smaller instances (but without upper bound
information during execution). Algorithm 1 is the slowest of the four procedures. We
would like to emphasize a few points:
(a) Varying arc attributes while holding the network topology and algorithm fixed
can lead to widely varying solution times: Compare means and standard
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deviations for the running times. In the larger networks, the fastest run (among
the 10 different runs) may be 100 times faster than the slowest. We are still
investigating ways to reduce the running times of the longer-running problems.
[MXSP-D] Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2E Algorithm 3
Problem ro To So Tj S, N, P, T2 S2 N2 P2 T3 S3 N3 P3
1 20 107 77 110 115 51 102 2 1 21 320 2 1 20 315
2 30 978 1215 (6) - 25 18 36 690 33 36 36 630
3 40 (7) _ 650 560 57 1205 220 185 51 1220
4 50 - -
- - - (5) - - - (7) - -
Table 2.1: Computational results for a network with 100=10x 10 inner nodes (a=396), p=100%, c=10, d=\0
and r=5. The numbers in parentheses represent the number of problems solved to optimality, out of 10
cases, within 3600 CPU seconds.
Legend: Th -Run time in CPU seconds for Algorithm h.
(0 = branch-and-bound on [MXSP-D], 2=2E)
S>h - Standard deviation in CPU seconds of Th
N/, - Number of iterations for Algorithm h.
PA - Number of constraints in the master problem when the algorithm h terminates.
(b) All the algorithms are very sensitive to ro, the total available interdiction resource.
Running time typically increases rapidly as ro increases from a small value but
then starts decreasing for sufficiently large values, beyond those displayed here.
(Variations in run times occur with changes in other data, but the basic trend
remains.) This makes sense since increasing interdiction resource allows more
combinations of arcs to be interdicted, up to a point, but then for sufficiently large
r
,
all or nearly all arcs can be interdicted, and the problem becomes relatively
easy.
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(c) In all problem instances, all of the algorithms find good solutions quickly: Most
of the running time is spent proving, or trying to prove, optimality.
(d) Table 2.2 displays results from runs designed to explore the sensitivity of the
algorithms to network shape. The decomposition algorithms prefer "tall
networks," like the 12x8 network, over "long networks" like the 7x14 network.
This tendency may result from the greater number of paths in a long network, the
potentially greater number of constraints in the corresponding master problems,
and because there is a positive correlation between the number of potential
constraints and the actual number needed to generate a tight master problem.
However, when not all of the arcs are interdictable (problems 8 and 9), the
decomposition algorithms handle long networks quite well (perhaps because there
are fewer potential constraints in the master problem). Branch-and-bound for
[MXSP-D] seems to perform better on long networks.
[MXSP-D] Algorithm 2E Algorithm 3
Problem m*n a P To So T2 S2 N2 P2 T3 S3 N3 P3
5 12x8 370 100% 415 665 1 1 18 195 1 1 18 240
6 8x12 382 100% 350 375 140 130 45 1075 100 70 43 1125
7 7x14 405 100% 182 210 (8) - (8) - - -
8 10x20 876 50% 98 135 30 51 40 495 58 83 38 535
9 10x40 1796 25% 85 140 20 24 55 400 62 90 52 480
Table 2.2: Computational results for networks with different network shapes, with r =25, c=10, d=\0
and r=5. The total number of potentially interdictable arcs is a and the percentage of interdictable arcs
from a is p. See Table 1 for other definitions.
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It may be possible to improve computation times substantially by settling for a
slightly less-than-optimal solution. So, we next repeat the tests on particularly difficult
problems, problems 3, 4 and 7, but allow a 5% optimality gap. Results are displayed in
Table 2.3. (Optimality gaps were described previously in absolute terms. Here, an
allowable gap of g% means 100(z-z)/z < g.) Indeed, run times can be significantly
shortened.
[MXSP-D] Algorithm 2E Algorithm 3
Problem To So T2 S 2 N2 P2 T3 S3 N3 P3
3 850 810 233 183 43 1070 114 77 40 1075
4 (7) (7) 960 815 56 1620
7 48 37 (9) 112 127 41 1770
Table 2.3: Computational tests on problems from Tables 1 and 2 with a 5% optimality gap allowed. See
Table l's legend for definitions.
In Table 2.4 we compare the algorithms for the case in which an interdicted arc is
actually removed from the network. We fix the cost of interdiction to one unit of
resource per arc, so we are actually solving the £-most-vital-arcs problem for £=5 and
k=\0 in 7x7, 10x10 and 14x14 networks. Note that for standard branch and bound
solving [MXSP-D] and for Algorithm 1, we use artificial delays of d=5 and d=\0.
However, d=5 is often too small and yields incorrect solutions while d=\0 results in long
run times. Branch and bound is the slowest algorithm on these problems, and Algorithm
2 is the fastest by a substantial margin. Results for Algorithm 3 are omitted since that
algorithm is slower than Algorithm 2. (We can view Algorithm 3 as Algorithm 2 with
Benders cuts added in the master problem. But, these cuts are weak for large d, do not
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add much information to Algorithm 2's master problem and mostly serve to hinder
solutions.) The table demonstrates the sensitivity of run times to network size and k.
Problem k m*n a
[MXSP-D1 Algorithm 1 Alg. 2E
d=5 d=\0 d=5 d=\0
8 5 7x7 188 2.6 [7] 20.3 1.3 [7] 2.8 0.2
9 10 7x7 188 70.4 [4] (5) 46.6 [5] 180.1 3.5
10 5 10x10 396 28.0 [6] 155.6 4.9 [6] 14.9 0.4
11 10 10x10 396 1334.0 [5] (0) 137.8 [6] 960.2 21.3
12 5 14x14 860 103.7 [9] 1353.0 14.6 [9] 43.7 1.7
Table 2.4: Results for the fc-most-vital-arcs problems. Numbers in parentheses are the number of problems
solved, in 10 trials, within 3600 CPU seconds (each). In the columns under d=5, numbers in brackets are
the number of problem solved correctly, out of the 10 trials. Numbers not in parentheses or brackets in the
"algorithm columns" are CPU seconds averaged over 10 trials.
Legend: k - Number of arcs the interdictor may interdict
(Every arc is potentially interdictable.)
d - Artificial delay. (Other data as in Tables 1-3.)
F. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed a shortest-path network-interdiction problem, MXSP,
on a directed network. The objective of "the interdictor" is to attack (interdict) network
arcs, using limited resources, so as to maximize the length of a shortest path between two
specified nodes. Interdiction of an arc increases its effective length, or destroys the arc
making it impassable. The ultimate purpose of the interdiction is to slow the movement
of the "network user" through a road or other transportation network.
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MXSP is an NP-complete, max-min problem. We show how to formulate the
problem as a mixed-integer program (MIP) but develop decomposition techniques that
typically solve test problems much more efficiently than does LP-based branch and
bound with the MIP. Our first technique applies Benders decomposition with a standard
master problem and shortest-path sub-problems, but the second decomposition uses a
unique set-covering master problem. A third decomposition algorithm is a hybrid of the
first two. Special techniques, including integrality cuts for the master problem and local
search to generate more than one Benders cut per iteration, significantly improve
efficiency over naive implementations of the decompositions. Numerous avenues are
open for further research. These are discussed in Chapter VI, Conclusions.
It is clear that our techniques may be generalized to "system interdiction
problems," as we shall demonstrate in next chapter. Later, we use these generalizations
to solve a "system-defense problem," in particular, the problem of hardening a road
network against attack; see Chapter IV. The issue of uncertainty in interdiction success
for MXSP is discussed in Chapter V.
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HL THE SYSTEM-INTERDICTION PROBLEM
The mathematical study of interdiction has, until now, focused on "network
interdiction" in which an enemy's supply lines, modeled as a network, are efficiently
disrupted by attacking network components, e.g., bridges, roads, rail lines, etc. The
purpose of this chapter is to generalize the network-interdiction techniques of Chapter II
to handle the interdiction of general systems, for instance, a segment of an economy that
is producing war materiel.
Our basic system-interdiction model assumes that the interdictor makes resource-
constrained, binary interdiction decisions to attack a system whose optimal operation is
modeled through a mixed-integer linear program. We suggest solving this model using
extensions of the three decomposition algorithms developed in Chapter EL We then
extend those three decomposition algorithms even further, to solve a more general
system-interdiction problem, where the optimal system operation is modeled through an
even more general optimization problem.
A. WHEN SYSTEM OPERATION CAN BE MODELED WITH A MIXED
INTEGER (LINEAR) PROGRAM
In this section, we assume that the optimal solution of the follower's system can
be adequately modeled through the optimization of an MIP. Let U = diag(u). Then, the
Mixed-Integer Linear System-Interdiction Problem (MDLSIP) is defined to be the
following leader's problem:
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[MILSIP] z* = min ^(x) where/^x) is defined by
xeX
[M-Sub(x)-1] /i(x)= max cry
yer(x)
and X = {xe{OJL}n
|
Rx < rj,
7(x) ={y\Ay<b,0<y<Ua-x),yGYINT },
where c,y, ueSR", c,be9?m , /4e9?wxw and YINT represents integer (or binary)
restrictions on none, some or all of the variables y. With the exception of the set YINr ,
formulation [MILSIP] is equivalent to formulation [LSIP], described in Chapter I.
Thus, Xj = 1 means that activity j is interdicted, and that changes the upper bound onjy,
from Uj to 0. For notational simplicity, this model assumes that every activity is
potentially interdictable but, in practice, certain activities will be off-limits, inaccessible
or otherwise unavailable for interdiction. A more significant assumption for modeling
purposes is:
Assumption 3.1: The set X is not empty and the inner maximization is feasible for every
interdiction plan x.
One can imagine more complicated problems where the interdictor's actions
affect more than one activity at a time, or where those actions change the costs of the
follower's activities or his available resources. The following proposition shows that
[MILSIP] can be modified to handle such situations.
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Proposition 3.1: Let
[MILSIP-1] min max cry-x rVy
xeX yey(x)
where X ={ie {Oi}"
|
Rx < r], and
Y(x) = {y<=X rh \Ay<b-Bk,0<y,yGs}
where B
y
> Vi,j . Then, [MCLSIP-1] can be transformed intoformulation [MILSIP].
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark: The restriction B
y
> is acceptable, because we don't expect that an
interdiction would relax any of the system's constraints.
We would like to solve [MILSIP] with Algorithm 1, the Benders decomposition,
but in order to do so we need to reformulate the problem. In Benders decomposition the
feasible region of the subproblem is fixed, independent of the first level variables (x in
our case,) while the objective function changes at every iteration. To obtain this situation
in our case, we force the interdiction through a penalty term in the objective function,
which will ensure that the use of an interdicted activity is not cost-effective. Then, we
can leave interdicted activities free in the subproblem (their upper bounds are not affected
by x), knowing for sure that these activities will not be used in an optimal solution. In
some problems like the max-flow network-interdiction problem, however, an "exact
penalty" of 1 allows an interdicted activity to be used without compromising equivalence
of the models, at least in terms of x (Cormican et al. 1997). The following proposition
gives us a more general result:
47-
Proposition 3.2: When Assumption 3.1 holds, there exists v* < oo such that, for every v >
v*
,
formulation [MELSIP] and the following problem, with V = diag(vl), have the same
set ofoptimal solutions in x and y:
[MELSIP
-2] z** = min /2 (x) where/2 (x) is defined by
xeX
[M - Sub(x) - 2] f2 (x) = max cry - xTVy
yeY
and X ={xe{0A}" |i«x<r},
7 = {y\Ay<b, < y < U, y e 77AT }.
Proof: First we show that for any x eX there exists v(x) such that for every v > v(x),
^(x) = ^(x), and arg max^(x) = arg max/2 (x) . To do so, it suffices to show that
yey(x) ' yeY
(a) Every optimal solution of [M-Sub(x)-1] is feasible to [M-Sub(x)-2] with equal
objective function value^—that is trivial—and,
(b) Every optimal solution of [M-Sub(x)-2] is feasible to [M-Sub(x)-1] with equal
objective function value. To show that we, need to find v(x) such that for every v
> v(x) every optimal solution y of [M-Sub(x)-2] satisfies xTVy = xTy = .
To show (b), define Sx = mini x y | y e 7, x y>0[, Mx = max cry - f (x)
L J yeY
(note that ./j(x) is clearly bounded) and finally vx = l +Mx /Sx . Then, if the optimal y
is such that x y>0, f2(x)<maxcy-Sx vx which is a contradiction because, by
yeY
definition, max c y - 8Xvx < f (x) and from (a) we know that f (x) < f2 (x)
.
yeY
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The number of feasible solutions xeA'is finite. So, let v* = max{v(x) |x e X}.
Corollary 3.1: MILSIP has an optimal solution where the follower's part of the solution
is a vertex of 7= { y | ^4y > b, < y < u, ye INTY).
Remark: Proposition 3.2 is a variation on Morton and Wood (1999). It is shown there
that fl (x) = f2 (x) for all x eX, when y is continuous, ;r; is an upper bound on the
optimal dual multiplier for the constraint v
y
- < Uj(l-Xj) in [M-sub(x)-l] taken over all
xeX and V = diag(7t). (Note that computing the best possible bound may require full
enumeration of the system value for every possible interdiction plan.) This approach
does not work when we allow discrete variables y.
Let V = diag(v*l). Based on Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.1, we can use
Algorithm 1, the Benders decomposition, with formulation [MILSIP-2]. Define:
[Master(7)] rnin z
xeX,z
s.t. z > c
r
y - x
rVy Vy <= Y
and apply Algorithm 1 using this master problem and the subproblem [M-Sub(x)-2].
Furthermore, it is clear that the integrality cuts of Chapter II are valid here, too, and can
tighten the relaxation of [Master(y)] (see Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.1).
(Straightforward adjustments are required since MXSP is a max-min interdiction
problem, while the development in this chapter is for min-max system interdiction.)
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As discussed in Chapter II with respect to MXSP, the subproblem of Algorithm
1 finds an optimal reaction of the follower to a specific interdiction plan, which is
feasible to the leader. Hence, ^(x) gives a lower bound on the leader's optimal solution
value. The master problem includes only a subset of the follower's vertices and hence it
yields an upper bound for the leader. Moreover, the feasible region of the subproblems is
fixed, with a finite number of vertices, and in every iteration of the subproblem, there is a
solution that is a different vertex of Y. Thus, the algorithm must converge.
We can sometimes refine the penalty term to tighten the master problem. For
instance, the penalty for different activities may be different. Such a modification is
essentially what we have in MXSP, where the penalty matrix V = D represents the local
delays on each arc. Moreover, given an interdiction plan x, the penalty multipliers
Vj (y) for each activity j, can be functions of the optimal solution of the subproblem
y = y(x) , as long as the cut we add to the master problem, z > ^c -j) ~^ xjvj(y)yj , is
j j
valid for all xeX. (But, V cannot be a function of x since the constraints in the master
problem would then be nonlinear.)
Fcould also have non-zero, off-diagonal entries representing second-order effects.
For instance, suppose that the two components of the system under study act "serially" so
that destroying either one is as good as destroying both, i.e., y\=yi. If that Benders cut
z<cry + [*i*2]
is valid, then so is the tighter cut
v
v
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T v -.5v
z<c y + [x l x2 \
- 5v v
Unfortunately, Proposition 3.2 and the discussion afterward do not suggest a
general technique to determine a valid and effective penalty matrix V. Sometimes the
structure of the system suggests one, as in MXSP with finite delays, but that is a special
case. Recall Example 2.1, where we show the difficulties that an insufficiently large
penalty might cause. On the other hand, the running time of Algorithm 1 can be
excessive if we use a large penalty (compare results for d= 5 and d = 10 in Table 3.4).
Therefore, we wish to devise an algorithm for MTLSIP, similar to Algorithm 2E, that
does not assume any bound on the local effect of an interdiction.
Following the arguments upon which Algorithm 2 is based, we assume large
penalty multipliers and wish to solve [Master(y)] for the first feasible solution with
objective value greater the current lower bound. This is accomplished by solving the
following set-covering problem (SCP):
[Master(Y) - 1] Find x e X
s.t. I(y)rx>l Vyey
where 7, (y) = 1 if yy > and Ij (y) = if y; = . We can do so because every x
feasible in [Master(7)-1] interdicts one of the basic (and positive) variables in every
vertex in Y, so x must be feasible in [Master(F)] and the leader's objective there
exceeds the lower bound, for v sufficiently large. In [Master(y)-1], the interdictor tries
to interdict all the vertices thus far exposed by the follower, so "vertices" take the place
of "paths" in the discussion ofAlgorithm 2 in Chapter II.
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Analogs of the various enhancements we have suggested for solving MXSP with
Algorithm 2 are applicable to solving MILSIP, too. To begin with, a local-search
procedure can be used to generate more than one vertex of the follower's feasible region
per iteration. For instance:
(a) If a linear program represents the follower's system, we can use the last simplex
tableau to reach some or all of the neighboring extreme points to the optimal
solution. (Reaching all neighboring extreme points could require too much work,
but a fixed computational budget could be allocated for finding some subset of
these points.)
(b) IfMEP represents the follower's system and [M-Sub(x)-1] is solved by branch and
bound, feasible solutions found during the enumeration could be used in place of
a local-search procedure.
Procedure Lift in Algorithm 2 is based on the penalties dk used in Algorithm 1,
and it must be modified to accompany the flexibility in the penalty matrix for the more
general case. (If v is "very large," it is likely that Lift will have no effect.) Similarly,
procedure Compare should be modified if the penalty matrix has non-zero off-diagonal
elements. However, when we use the same diagonal penalty matrix V for all the
solutions of the subproblem, procedures Compare and Lift remain as they were in
MXSP.
Lastly, we can solve MILSIP with a hybrid decomposition algorithm, just as we
use Algorithm 3 for MXSP.
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B. INTERDICTION OF EVEN MORE GENERAL SYSTEMS
We now generalize our results for interdiction of general systems, where optimal
solution of the follower's system can be adequately modeled through an arbitrary
optimization model. Thus, the General System Interdiction Problem (GSIP) is defined to
be the following leader's problem:
[GSIP] z * = min /(x) where/(x) is defined by
xeX
[G-Sub(x)] /(x)= max g(x,y)
yer(x)
and let y(x) = argmax g(x,y). (We assume that 7(x) is non-empty, g(x,y) is bounded
yeF(x)
over Y(x) for all xel and the argmax is always unique.)
For constructing a Benders-type decomposition for solving GSIP, essentially
Algorithm 1, we reformulate the problem as follows:
Proposition 3.3: Assume thatfor every x eX, we can find a scalar c(k)and vector of
penalty multipliers v(x) that satisfy
/(£) = c(x)-v(x) r£ [3.3.1], and
/(x) > c(x)-v(x) rx Vi£l [3.3.2].
Then, z* - z * * where z* is defined by [GSIP], and z** is defined by
[GSIP-1] z** = min z
z,x
s.t. z>c(x)-v(x) rx VxeX.
Furthermore, [GSIP] and [GSIP-1] share the same set of optimal solutions in x
Proof: From formulation [GSIP-1], z * * = minz(x) where z(x) = max (c(x) - v(x) x}
,
xeX ieX
and conditions [3.3.1] and [3.3.2] ensure that z(x) = /(x) for all x eX.
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Corollary 3.2: For every x gX such that v(x)rx = 0, c(£) = /(£) is necessary to
satisfy condition [3.3.1] .
A straightforward implementation of Benders decomposition to formulation
[GSIP-1] defines:
fMaster(X)] min z
s.t. z>c(x)-v(£)r x Viel,
where X is a subset of the set of feasible interdiction plans. (We usually associate each
constraint with a solution of the subproblem, but this representation is equivalent.) Given
an interdiction plan x suggested by the master problem, the subproblem should find a
scalar c(x)and vector of penalties v(x) such that conditions [3.3.1-2] hold. Assume that
we have such a subproblem, denote it by [G-Sub(x)]; Then, we have established
Algorithm 1 for [GSDP]. Note that X is discrete and bounded, and therefore finite, so
convergence is guaranteed.
From Corollary 3.2, in order to validate conditions [3.3.1-2] we need to solve [G-
Sub(x)] exactly so that we know /(x) exactly. However, sometimes a sub-optimal
solution of [G-Sub(x)] is sufficient:
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Proposition 3.4: Assume thatfor any x gX such that f(x) > z *, the scalar c(x)and the
vector ofpenalties v(x) satisfy
z* < c(x)-v(x) rx [333], and
f{x) > c(x)-y(xfx VxeX [33.4].
(The multipliers need not satisfy conditions [3.3. 1 -2]
.) And, for any x eX such that
/(x) = z*, c(x)and v(x) satisfy conditions [33.1-2]. Then, z* = z** (where z is
defined by [GSIPJ andz** is defined by [GSIP- 1 ]. )
Proof: Condition [3.3.3] ensures that z(x) > z * for any xeX such that /(x) > z *, and
for any x eX such that f(x) = z *, conditions [3.3.1] and [3.3.2] ensure that z(x) = z * .
Thus, z * * = minz(x) = z*.
xeX
We now describe a possible use for the last proposition. Assume that during the
solution process of [G-Sub(x)] we know that x cannot be optimal, i.e., we find y such
that g(x,y) > z . Then, by Proposition 3.4, verifying that conditions [3.3.3-4] hold with
respect to x is sufficient to guarantee convergence. See an implementation of this idea
in Chapter IV, in Procedure Cutoff.
Now that we have established the basics of Algorithm 1 for [GSIP], we can
modify, extend and improve the techniques as we did for MXSP and MELSIP:
(a) Add all the enhancements discussed with regard to Algorithm 1, including the
integrality cuts,
(b) Derive Algorithm 2 and 2E (when the different enhancements are practical), and,
(c) Finally, derive Algorithm 3 for [GSIP].
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We would like to point out that the existence of scalars and penalty multipliers
that satisfy conditions [3.3.1-2] does not require that the function /(x) be convex, or
anything else, when the set X includes only binary variables. This is so because we are
interested in the value of f(x) only at certain of the corner points of the ^-dimensional
hypercube, and over these points it is possible to support any kind of function with a
linear cut. (For instance, if we know that z* > we can always set c(x) = /(x) and for
every k, let vk (x) = f(x). The corresponding cut we add to the master problem,
z ^ c(x) - ^XjVj(x)yj , would be valid, but useless.) However, it is usually easier to
3
find relatively good penalty multipliers when the function /(x) is convex for continuous
x, using gradient or sub-gradient information.
In general, Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 do not provide a method to
derive the necessary penalty multipliers for Benders cuts (although the constant c(x) can
always be found by solving [G-Sub (x) ]). However,, we exploit those propositions in the
next two chapters to validate penalty multipliers that we can create based on the special
structure of certain system-defense problems.
C. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have shown that the techniques used to solve the shortest-path
network-interdiction problem can be used for solving interdiction problems concerned
with more complicated systems. Sufficient conditions are given to establish a Benders-
type decomposition algorithm for solving a general system-interdiction problem, too.
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The construction of a useful decomposition algorithm for solving a system-
interdiction problem depends on the specific structure of the interdicted system. As
shown in this chapter, the helpful enhancements for solving MXSP we saw in Chapter II
may be applicable to other interdiction problems, as well.
In the next two chapters we use this chapter's results to construct algorithms for a
system-defense problem and a stochastic system-interdiction problem. Both cases are
based on MXSP, but just as we have shown in this chapter, the results there can be
applied to more general system-defense and stochastic system-interdiction problems.
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IV. SYSTEM DEFENSE - THE SHORTEST-PATH NETWORK
DEFENSE PROBLEM
When a system user expects his system to be interdicted, he may be able to
expend resources to protect that system to mitigate against the effects of interdiction. In
this section we are interested in the following question: How should a system user
employ limited resources to "harden" the components of his system to best protect
against interdiction, given that the interdictor will optimize his interdiction with
knowledge of those improvements? To answer to this question, we formulate and discuss
the general system-defense problem (SD) and suggest extensions of Algorithm 1-3 as
solution procedures.
In the United States, the importance of system defense has been underscored by
establishment of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
(PCCIP). The executive order that creates the PCCIP (The White House 1996) states:
"Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity
or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or
economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures
include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage
and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply
systems, ...."
The goal of PCCIP is to develop a strategy for protecting those systems against both
physical and electronic attacks. The models we propose are most suitable for studying
survivability of systems subject to physical attack.
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Throughout the development of SD, we use the problem of Defending the
Shortest Path (DSP) as an illustrative example. However, the results can be easily
generalized to other and more general system defense problems.
A. DEFENDING THE SHORTEST PATH - THE MODEL
DSP is an extension to MXSP (see Chapter H), where before the leader attempts
any interdictions, the network user may harden (protect) some of his arcs against a
possible interdiction. The network user has a fixed budget for hardening arcs and any
hardened arc is considered invulnerable to subsequent interdiction. So, in DSP, the
network user first hardens certain arcs, the leader then interdicts some subset of
"unhardened" arcs, and finally the network user traverses a post-interdiction shortest
path.
We assume that the network user has limited resources and that he cannot make
his system completely invulnerable. Thus, the network user cannot completely protect
any shortest s-t path. Let the set of feasible defense plans for the network user be given
by G = {g € {0,1} Hg < h}. We assume absolute protection so that gk = 1 implies that
arc k cannot be interdicted. DSP finds the optimal defense strategy for the network user,
g*, and the value of the system, i.e., the length of the shortest path the network user is
assured to have available for use.
Notice that for every feasible defense plan g, the associated value of the system is
given by a solution to an MXSP where the protected activities are invulnerable. And,
recall that MXSP is NP-hard. Thus, we need to solve an NP-hard problem just to
evaluate the objective function of a feasible solution to DSP. This fact leads to the
following complexity result:
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Proposition 4.1: DSP is NP-hard and not known to be in NP.
Formally, given a graph Q={N,A), DSP is defined as the following problem for
the system user:
[DSP] zD = min max min c
r
y
geG xeX(g) yeY(x)
where G = {g e {OJL} ^' I #g < h},
X(g) = [xe{Oa}^'|i?x<r,0<x<l-g}, and
y is an incidence vector for an s -
1
Y(x) = y
path that is feasible with respect to x
j
Note that DSP is a min-max-min instance of the Linear System-Defense Problem
(LSDP), which we defined in Chapter I (since 7(x) can be represented by a set of linear
flow-balance constraints and non-negativity restrictions). For modeling purposes we have
the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1: The sets G, X(g) for all geGand 7(x) for all x
[x g {0,1}^ ' Rx < r, < x < 1j are not empty.
DSP can be viewed as a min-max system-interdiction problem where the network
user is the leader and the interdictor is the follower. In DSP, the network user, now
called the "defender," minimizes the effectiveness of the interdictor's best possible
interdiction plan by choosing a defense plan that prevents, or "interdicts," some of the
interdictor's possible activities. This observation suggests solving DSP through a nested
decomposition algorithm. In particular, the master problem for DSP uses one of
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Algorithms 1, 2 or 3, except that the variables correspond to defense plans, rather than
interdiction plans, and each subproblem solves an instance ofMXSP by applying one of
those algorithms.
B. NESTED DECOMPOSITION FOR SOLVING DSP
Let z(g) be the length of the shortest-path the network user guarantees by
defending with plan g. Then, the network user's problem is equivalent to min z(g)
.
geG
By Proposition 3.3, to apply Algorithm 1 to DSP, it suffices to have for any
given defense plan g a constant c(g) and a vector of penalties vD such that:
(a) z(.g)>c(g)-g TVDx(g) V geG, and
(b) z(g) = c(g)-grVbx(g),
where VD = diag(v£>), and x(g) is the optimal response of the interdictor to g
.
Since g VDx(g) = for all geG (the interdictor cannot interdict a protected
arc), based on Corollary 3.2 we must set c(g) = z(g) = cry(x(g)) , where y(x(g))
denotes the shortest-path response of the network user given x(g) . Thus, we can
calculate c(g) by solving the MXSP associated with defense plan g . (For simplicity, we
assume that y(x(g)) and x(g) are unique, but all results in this chapter can easily be
generalized to allow multiple optimal responses.)
Assuming the existence of a valid penalty vector v^, we can solve DSP through
NestedAlgorithm J (denoted by NA-1) where the master problem and subproblem are:
[D - Master(G)] Zx - min zG geG
s.t. z>cTy(x(g))-gTVDx(g) VgeG
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[D - Sub(g)] zx = max min crys xeX(g) yer(x)
where X(g) =[xe{04}^' R* < r,0< x < 1 -gl, and
F(x) =<
y is an incidence vector for an s -
1
path that is feasible with respect to x
where G is a subset of all the possible defense plans.
At every iteration of the decomposition algorithm, the master problem suggests a
new defense plan g and update zD , and the subproblem solves the system-interdiction
problem associated with g , adds the solution to G , and updates zd , if appropriate. (The
subproblem is simply an MXSP which is solved with Algorithm 1, or 2 or 3.) If the
solution of the master problem or the subproblem is ever repeated, we must have
zd - ZD and the algorithm has converged. Therefore, the algorithm is theoretically
guaranteed to converge, if the number of possible interdiction plans or defense plans is
finite.
The remaining question is, of course, how to determine a valid penalty vector v^
.
We will answer this question for DSP, as well for the more general LSDP, under the
following assumption.
Assumption 4.2: The feasible set of interdiction plans, X, is "closed" in the sense that
any interdiction plan that is apart ofafeasible interdiction plan isfeasible too.
This assumption is reasonable if interdictions consume non-negative quantities of
resource and do not generate additional resource.
63
Proposition 4.2: Let V[ = diag(v) be a valid penalty matrix for a linear system
interdiction problem LSIP:
[LSIP] Zj = min max cry
xeX yer(x)
where X ={xe {0,1}"
|
Rx < r\ and
Y(x) ={y\Ay<b, 0<y<U(l-x)}.
i.e., (by Proposition 3.2) [LSIP] araf [LSIP-1] /zaw the same set of optimal solutions
and the same objectivefunction value, where:
[LSIP-1] Zt = min max cry-x ry7y
xeX yeY
where X = {xg {0,1}"
|
Rx < r}, and
7 = {y|^y<b, 0<y<U)}.
Also, let [LSDP] be the system-defense problem associated with [LSIP]:
[LSDP] Zn = max min max cry
geG x€X(g) yey(x)
where 5 = {g e{0$n | #g<h},
X(g) =[xg{04}" |/&<r,0<x<l-g], and
y(x) ={y|^y<b, 0<y<C/(l-x)}.
Then, when Assumption 4.2 /*oA&, VD = Vj is a validpenalty matrixfor solving SD with
algorithm NA-1.
Proof: By Proposition 3.3 and Corollary 3.2, it is sufficient to show that for all x e X
and gsG, zD (g) = c
T
y <c
T
y(x) + g
TVjX where y = y(x(g)). Let Xg be the
interdiction plan that interdicts an activity only if it is interdicted by interdiction plan x
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and not protected by g. Assumption 4.1 and the construction ensure that Xg eX(g)
.
Clearly, c y(Xg) > zD (g). Now, y(Xg) e Y(x) and due the optimality of y(x) in the inner
maximization in [LSIP-1] that is associated with x, we must have
c y(x) > c ry(Xg) - x ry7 y(Xg) . Notice that (x
TVIy(xg )) k > can happen only when
y(xg)* > Oand xk = 1, but that implies gk = xk =1. So, x
rV7y(Xg) = g
rV7 y(Xg), and
c y(x) + g V^y(Xg) > c y(Xg) . This finishes the proof because cry(Xg) > Zpig), and
so c
r
y(x) + g
rV7y(Xg) > zD (g) , too.
Corollary 4.1: Proposition 4.2 holds even when some or all of the variables y
(the system's fundamental variables) are restricted to integer values, since nowhere in the
proof of that proposition is y is required to be continuous.
To better understand Proposition 4.2, consider its meaning in DSP. In this case,
interdicting an arc k increases the length of the arc by dk, and hence cannot increase the
length of the shortest path by more than dk. In the same sense, protecting this arc cannot
decrease the shortest path by more than the difference between the original length of the
arc and its length after interdiction, namely dk. Indeed, Proposition 4.2 proves that
VD = D , where Z)=diag(d), will work.
We now focus on [D-Sub(g)] in NA-1 for DSP. We might need to solve this
problem many times and so it may be useful to have some kind of a "warm start," that
uses information from previous iterations. When solving [D-Sub(g)], the master
problem is:
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[Sub(g)-Master(Y)] z$ = max z
Y xeX(g)
s.t. z<cry + x
rDy Vye7
Notice that all the cuts of the form z < c y + \ TDy are valid independent of the defense
plan. Thus, as a warm start, we can begin a new iteration of the algorithm with the set Y
from the end of the previous iteration.
In NA-1 we also incorporate Procedure Cutoff. Recall that the smallest objective
values from the subproblems (the interdictor's problem) solved so far is an upper bound
on zD , denoted by zd In consecutive iterations, we can terminate solving a subproblem
when, given g , the subproblem finds a sub-optimal solution x(g) e X(g) with optimal
response y(x(g)) such that cry(x(g)) > zd This technique uses Proposition 3.4: Once
we recognize that the current defense plan g is not optimal, the new cut generated from
the subproblem need not be tight at g . Thus we stop solving the subproblem with a sub-
optimal solution x(g) , add x(g) to X and solve again the master defense problem.
Convergence is guaranteed because the new Benders cut, z > cry(x(g))-grWx(g)
ensures that g can no longer be the optimal solution of the master defense problem.
(Recall that the solution of the master defense problem z- is a lower bound. If g were
still optimal, we would have a contradiction since we cannot have
zk > c
r
y(x(g)) - g
rHx(g) > zd .)
Nested Algorithm 2E, denoted by NA-2 and derived from Algorithm 2E, can be
used to solve DSP (and other LSDPs) as well. In the highest level, the system user tries
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to prevent interdiction plans suggested by the interdictor. For each new defense plan the
interdictor solves the interdiction problem with Algorithm 2E. When the system user
fails to prevent all the interdiction plans suggested so far by the interdictor, the algorithm
terminates. The best defense plan the system user has tried until now is an optimal
defense plan. The algorithm must converge if the number of possible interdiction plans
or defense plans is finite.
Recall that Algorithm 2E includes several special procedures, namely
Local_Search, Compare and Lift. The concept of local search in DSP translates into
the generation of more than one interdiction plan (to be covered by a defense plan) per
iteration. Fortunately, when we solve each subproblem we are actually suggesting
interdiction plans and evaluating their objective function values (shortest-path lengths
given the interdiction). We can keep this information and every interdiction plan with
objective value higher than zD (when the interdiction plan was exposed or after the
lower bound was updated), can be introduced into the set of interdiction plans to be
covered by any new defense plan.
Procedures Compare and Lift, as described in Chapter II with respect to MXSP,
apply to DSP with essentially no change.
In NA-2 we incorporate Procedure Cutoff just as we do in NA-1. This procedure
is helpful when we have a good heuristic for the interdictor' s problem, and we do have
such a heuristic when the interdictor has a single resource constraint. In this case, we can
solve the interdictor' s master problem as an SCP ([Master(7)-2c] in Chapter II), and we
can run Algorithm 2E as a heuristic by solving that master problem using only the
greedy SCP heuristic.
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Last, as we suggested for NA-1, we can employ a warm start in NA-2 using
information from previous iterations. This may speed the convergence of the inner
Algorithm 2 used to solve the subproblem. Recall that at the end of Algorithm 2E we
have two sets of s-t paths. Those sets are Y and Y* where Y* is a set of "reserve
paths." We can merge these two sets and use them as a starting reserve set for the next
iteration of the inner covering algorithm used to solve the subproblem. By doing this, we
may require fewer iterations to generate a list of extreme points in Y that the interdictor
cannot cover, and thus solve the subproblem using fewer iterations.
Unfortunately, computational experience indicates that the effort involved with
the warm start is not always worthwhile. In MXSP we are able to generate paths very
quickly, but we drop dominated paths and lift others, so the actual set Y at the end of the
algorithm is only a small subset of the paths that were generated during the course of the
algorithm. Therefore, if we want to save all the original paths, extra work is needed; it
may be simpler and faster to regenerate those paths in subsequent iterations.
So far, we have discussed two nested decomposition algorithms for solving DSP,
NA-1 and NA-2. In should be clear that we can also establish an analogous version of
Algorithm 3, Nested Algorithm 3 (NA-3). Given the above discussion creating this
algorithm is straightforward and we omit any further description.
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C. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE
To test the algorithms we have constructed, we use the same structure of the test
problems of Chapter II. The only additional parameters are the total defense resource
available /*o(we assume a single defense resource) and the defense resource needed to
defend each arc k, namely hk , which is integer and uniformly distributed on [l,h].
Algorithm NA-1 is tested with procedures Warm_Start and Cutoff. Algorithm NA-2 is
tested only with procedure Cutoff. We do not test NA-3 here because for the amount of
interdiction resources examined, Algorithm 2E and Algorithm 3 give similar results (see
Table 2.1)
Table 4.1 shows the average results across 10 problems for 3 different
combinations of defense and interdiction resources. For instance, in NA-2 problem set
3D, the master defense problem includes 535 cuts on average, each one representing an
interdiction plan. The algorithm generates those 535 interdiction plans while solving
only 265 interdiction problems, because of the Local_Search procedure. Moreover,
those 155 interdiction problems are solved in 440 CPU seconds, even though a single
interdiction problem with 30 units of interdiction resources requires 25 seconds CPU on
average (see Table 2.1 problem set 2.) The time improvement factor is almost 10, and is
a result of procedure Cutoff.
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Algorithm NA-1 Algorithm NA-2
Prob ho n> Tx Sj Nf Nl T s2 Nj nJ PD
ID 10 20 325 60 40 140 33 17 65 1210 155
2D 15 20 475 175 72 180 75 70 135 1670 305
3D 10 30 - - - 440 265 155 3375 535
Table 4.1: Computational results for the shortest-path network defense problem, with 10x10 inner nodes
(a=396), c=10, d=l0, r=5 and h=5.
Legend: .
s,-
n!
Running time in CPU seconds for Algorithm NA-/.
Standard deviation in CPU seconds of T
z
.
Number of iterations in the master defense problem in NA-;.
Total number of iterations in the master problem of the sub-
problem (the interdiction problem) in NA-/'.
Number of interdiction plans (i.e., cuts) in the master defense
problem in NA-2.
In NA-1 we can see the advantage of procedure Warm_Start, too. In NA-1
problem set 2D, we solve 72 interdiction problems on average, with total of 180 master
iterations in the interdiction problems. On the other hand, when we solve only one
interdiction problem, we need 51 iterations on average (see Table 3.1). Thus, every new
defense plan requires, on average, only 2 iterations in the interdiction problem, due to the
Warm_Start and Cutoff procedures. Those 72 interdiction problems are solved in 475
CPU seconds while a single interdiction problem requires 110 CPU seconds (see Table
3.1). Therefore, the overall time improvement factor is more than 15.
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D. CONCLUSIONS
The system-defense problem that we first defined as a natural extension for the
system-interdiction problem, turns out to be a system-interdiction problem in itself,
where the defender interdicts the interdictor's system. This observation let us solve the
problem of defending the shortest path with nested decomposition algorithms.
Fortunately:
(a) We can use the fact that the defender interdicts a system-interdiction problem, to
find valid penalty multipliers that are needed in Algorithm 1,
(b) The enhancements included in Algorithm 2E are applicable here, too, and
(c) Every subproblem solves a system-interdiction problem with a decomposition
algorithm, but solving k subproblems doesn't require k times the time that one
problem requires, due to Warm_Start and Cutoff procedures we include in the
nested decomposition.
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V. STOCHASTIC SHORTEST-PATH NETWORK INTERDICTION
Uncertainty may play a key role in some interdiction scenarios. For instance, the
interdictor may have only limited intelligence on the system he attacks, and the success
of interdiction attempts may be uncertain. Thus, the interdictor must determine his
actions with incomplete information about the current state of the system and/or how the
system will "react" after interdiction. We take an obvious approach to modeling
stochastic situations: We assume that the interdictor has a measure for the expected value
of the system after interdiction, and that he wishes to degrade this measure as much as
possible.
Throughout the chapter we focus on the max-min stochastic shortest-path
network-interdiction problem, S-MXSP, where interdiction success is uncertain. We note
that Cormican et al. (1998) have studied one stochastic network-interdiction problem,
with a different objective than MXSP, where other network data may be uncertain, too.
However, we assume that all network data are known exactly. We show how the results
of Chapter HI can be used to establish decomposition algorithms for solving such
stochastic network-interdiction problems, exactly or approximately. The approach can be
used for solving other stochastic system-interdiction problems, too.
A. THE MODEL
The mathematical programming formulation of S-MXSP on a directed graph
£=CAM> is:
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[S-MXSP] max£
xeX
where:
(a) s
€{04} is a random vector: The outcome of the random variable sk is
denoted by sk . sk = l with probability/?^ and sk =0 with probability \-pk. Thus,
< pk < 1 is the probability an interdiction attempt on arc k is successful. We
assume that the successes of separate interdiction attempts are independent
events.
(b) The rest of the formulation is the same as in MXSP. Thus,
X = {x 6{0,lr ' |^x < r} represents the set of feasible interdiction plans and Y is
the set of all s-t paths, represented in MXSP through flow balance constraints.
For simplicity and without lost of generality we assume that for every k, dk < 00
(an infinite delay can be replaced by a very large, but finite, delay, which would
ensure that no shortest path would use arc k when it is interdicted), and we assume
that all arcs are interdictable (a non-interdictable arc k can be modeled by setting
4=0).
In S-MXSP, the inner minimization problem is a standard shortest-path problem
with arc lengths c* + Xk sk dk. That is, the network user finds a shortest s-t path given the
interdiction plan x and its random outcome xksk for every k. We denote this shortest
path by y(x,s) where ^(x,s) = 1 if the path y(x,s) uses arc k, else yk (x,s) = 0. For
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simplicity, we assume y(x,s) is unique, but all results in this chapter can easily be
generalized to allow multiple shortest paths.
Let E ^Hick +xkskdk )yk
Y kik
= E ^(ck +xkskdk )yk (x,s)
k<=A
= z(x) be the
expected length of the shortest s-t path given interdiction plan x, so that S-MXSP is
equivalent to maxz(x). z(x) can be calculated exactly by solving the shortest-path
xeX
problem associated with each outcome of the random vector s. The literature also offers
several algorithms for estimating z(x) (e.g., Alexopoulos 1997, Fishman 1985).
The basic model assumes that only a single interdiction may be attempted on any
arc. The following discussion shows that this is not actually a restriction. Assume that
we have an arc k, which can be attacked by n different methods. Each method includes
one or more independent and/or dependent interdiction attempts. For instance, arc k can
be attacked by an airplane formation, 2 cruise missiles, or both, so we have three possible
methods. Denote by pJk the probability of successful interdiction when method of attack
j is chosen, and by d{ the delay expected on arc k when attack by methodj is successful.
To handle this situation we introduce the following construction:
(a) We "break" the arc k into n serial arcs, k 1 ,. .
.
,k
n
,
each with length ck /n
.
(b) We set the probability of successful interdiction on arc kJ to be pJk and the delay
when the arc is interdicted successfully to d{ .
(c) Last, we add the constraint x
x
+jc 2 +•••+* „ < 1 to make sure that only one
method of attack is chosen (recall that a method of attack may include several
interdiction attempts).
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The construction ensures that if none of the arcs k l ,...,kn is interdicted, or one of
the arcs is interdicted but not successfully, the effective length of the composite arc k\ is
nx(ck /ri) = ck . But if method of attack j is chosen, and arc kJ is interdicted
successfully, the effective length of the composite arc k\ is n x (ck /n) + d{ , as required
B. DECOMPOSITION APPROACH
By Corollary 3.2, we can construct Algorithm 1 for solving S-MXSP ifwe have
constants c(x) and penalty multipliers v^^) such that:
[5.1] z(x) = c(x) + ^Tvk (x)xk VxgI, and
keA
[5.2] z(x) < c(x) +X vk(%)xk V x, x e X
Given the coefficients c(x) and v(x) , the master problem ofAlgorithm 1 is
|Master(X)l max z
s.t. z < c(x) + 2 vk(*)xic f°r every x e X
keA
where X is a subset of the set of feasible interdiction plans, and the subproblem, Sub(x),
provides c(x)and v(x)such that [5.1] and [5.2] hold. The following proposition shows
how valid c(x) and v(x) can be calculated.
Proposition 5.1: For every x gX, define.
[5.3] c(x) = 2^£ fc(x^)], and
keA
[5.4] vk (x) = dkE[skyk (x,~s)] WeA
Then, conditions [5-1] and [5-2] hold.
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Proof:
z(x) =E
= E
<E
min ^(ck +xkskdk )yk
y*Y keA
^(ck +xkskdk )yk (x,s)
keA
Y,(ck +xkskdk )yk (k,s)
keA
for all x g X
and equality must hold when x = x, because given x and s, yk {x,s) is, by definition,
the shortest path. Now,
Y,(ck +xkskdk )yk (x,s)
keA
= Z £M*(x,s)]+ ^xkdkE[skyk (x,s)]
keA keA
= c(x)+^vk (x)xk , m
keA
Remarks:
(a) c( x ) is the average length of the shortest path that the network user traverses,
excluding delays, given interdiction plan x . £"[^(x, s)] is the probability that the
network user traverses arc k, given interdiction plan x
.
(b) If xk = 1 , Vjt(x ) is the average delay the network user experiences on arc k, given
interdiction plan x. E[skyk (x,s)] is the probability that the network user
traverses arc k given that the arc is successfully interdicted.
(c) The proposition actually establishes that if x does not interdict arc k, v*(x)
bounds the (average) gain the interdictor can achieve over z(x) by interdicting
this arc. Notice that when xk =0, E[skyk (x,s)] = E[sk ]E[yk (x,s)]
11
= pkE[yk (x, s)] where E[^(x,s)] is the probability that the network user
traverses arc k given interdiction plan x.
Proposition 5.1 enables solution of S-MXSP through Benders decomposition,
i.e., through Algorithm 1, at least in theory. The master problem suggests an interdiction
plan x , and the subproblem (/') evaluates z{ x ), which may update the lower bound, and
(if) generates a new cut for the master problem through calculation of £[^(x,s)] and
E[skyk (x,s)]. To compute these expected values, the subproblem solves 2^
Xk
shortest
path problems, one for each possible outcome of the interdiction plan x
.
In addition, we can use the Benders cut for building the integrality and covering
cuts in the usual way (see Chapter HI), establishing versions of Algorithm 2E, the
covering decomposition, and Algorithm 3, the hybrid algorithm, for solving S-MXSP.
An important part of those two algorithms is a local-search procedure that can find more
than one covering cut per iteration. We will discuss this in more detail later.
A major difficulty of all three decomposition algorithms is the exponential
complexity of the subproblem. For instance, if an interdiction plan interdicts 10 arcs, the
subproblem requires solution of 1024 shortest-path problems, which our code does in less
than 2 CPU seconds (for a 10 x 10 network). An average of 2 seconds CPU time for the
subproblem is not a major concern. But, if the interdiction plan interdicts 20 arcs, the
running time of the subproblem increases to over 2000 CPU seconds per iteration! Thus,
the subproblem quickly becomes intractable.
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C. APPROXIMATION THROUGH DECOMPOSITION
In trying to cope with the complexity of the subproblem, we suggest a series of
approximation algorithms which share the following principles:
(a) There is no change in the master problem; either one of the three decomposition
master problems may be used. But, to keep the discussion simple, we assume that
the master problem of Algorithm 1 is used.
(b) The subproblem solves a "reasonable number" of shortest-path problems.
(c) Given an interdiction plan x , the subproblem for approximation h, sets values for
c(x) = ch (x) and v^x) = v£(x) such that [5-2] holds, i.e.,
z(x)<ch (x) +^v£(x)xk Vx,xeX. As a direct result,
z
h (x) = c h (x)+ 2 vk(*)Xk is an upper bound for z(x).
keA
(d) We add to the master problem for approximation h the valid inequality, or "slack
cut," z < c
h (x)+ 2 vj^ (x)jc^ . We call that a "slack cut" because [5-1] may
keA
not hold. However, since [5-2] holds, the value of the objective function of the
master problem, denoted by z for approximation h, is a valid upper bound for
the solution of S-MXSP. We may also add to the master problem the integrality
cut associated with this slack cut.
(e) For a given master problem, we define zh =maxz
h
(x). We use zh as an
xeX
artificial, possibly invalid, lower bound on z(x*).
(f) When the difference between z and z drops below a designated approximation
gap, we say that "the approximation algorithm has converged."
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(g) The algorithm must converge because the number of feasible interdiction plans is
finite, and in every iteration the master problem either suggests a new interdiction
plan that is not yet in X
,
or z
h
= z
h
.
(h) The procedure actually solves a problem with a modified objective zh (x).
h
Denote by x the optimal (or nearly so) solution that approximation algorithm h
achieves using the modified objective,
(i) When practical, the algorithms establish a lower bound on the solution of S-
MXSP and a true optimality gap, z -z(x ), by calculating z(x ) using full
enumeration. When this is impractical, the algorithms estimate z(x ) through
sampling. (Any other algorithm that gives a lower bound on z(x ) could be used
here, too.)
(j) Last, as an optional step, full enumeration ofz(x ) can be used to tighten the cut
in the master problem associated with x , and the master problem can be re-
solved. This may improve the upper bound.
To establish an approximation algorithm as described above, we only require a
subproblem that sets values for c (x) and v£(x) such that [5-2] holds. Next, we
introduce a proposition that helps us to derive such subproblems, but first we need some
definitions.
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Definition 5.1: A deterministic reply strategy y (s) for the network user, is a function
that assigns an s-t path y (s) , for all possible outcomes s eS
.
The deterministic reply strategy represents a possible way of action for the
network user. Given outcome s, the reply strategy assumes that the network user
traverses path y (s) , independently of the current interdiction plan. This is a feasible
reply but the network user may have better choices. Therefore, for every interdiction plan
x, the average shortest-path length achieved by y^s) given x, is an upper bound on
z(x) . We now define a more general set of feasible reply strategies.
Definition 5.2: A randomized reply strategy y /l (s) for the network user is a function that
assigns a probability distribution <j>(y | s), over the set of all s-t paths (denoted by y e Y ),
for all possible outcomes se5. (Thus, ]T <f>(y |s) =1 for all s e S.
)
y
A
(s) also represents a possible way of action for the network user. Given
outcome s , the randomized reply strategy assumes that the network user traverses path y
with probability ^(y | s) , independently of the current interdiction plan. Note that any
deterministic reply strategy can be defined as a randomized reply strategy, too. We now
show formally how to devise a slack cut, and thus an approximation algorithm, from any
reply strategy.
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Proposition 5.2: Let y^(s) be a randomized reply strategy associated with
approximation h. Define.
[5.5]
[5.6]
c*(x) =^ckE
keA yeY
v*(x) =^£ skHh(y\^yk
yeY
and
VkzA
Then, [5-2] holds, i.e., z(x) < ch (x) +£ v£ &)xk V x, x g X.
k<=A
Proof: For all x e X,
z(x) = £
= E
mm ^(ck +xkskdk )yk
yeY keA
minZ
<E
yer
s
Jte.4
yeYkeA\
(ck +xkskdk)Y,h(y\ s )yk
yeY
= TckE 2>x(yl s ):y*
keA lyeY
keA
+ xkdkE sk ^<j>k (y\s)yk
.
y*Y
Corollary 5.1: We can establish an approximation algorithm by defining how a
subproblem sets a reply strategy, deterministic or randomized, for any given interdiction
plan x .
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Thus, in the approximation algorithms the subproblem takes in an interdiction
plan x and returns a randomized reply strategy y~(s) or a deterministic reply strategy
y^(s) . In the exact decomposition algorithm the subproblem does the same, but there it
finds the best reply strategy (which is always deterministic), while in the approximation
algorithm the subproblem finds a sub-optimal strategy. However, in order for the
approximation algorithm to work effectively, it should find a relatively good reply
strategy without too much computational effort. We next describe several approximation
algorithms, each one characterized by its reply strategy.
Algorithm HI
The first approximation through decomposition uses a simple expected-value
approach. Given interdiction plan x, let y
1 (x)be the shortest s-t path in the network
using expected arc lengths, i.e., using arc lengths ck + xkpkdk . Now, for all interdiction
plans x, define the deterministic reply strategy by y^(s) = y
1 (x) for all seS. By
Corollary 5.1 we have established an approximation algorithm, Algorithm HI.
The modified objective in HI (see principle (h)) assumes that the follower knows
the chosen interdiction plan and all success probabilities, but not the actual outcome of
the executed interdiction plan. This "restricts the recourse" of the follower (see Morton
and Wood 1999) so we obtain an upper bound on the solution for S-MXSP, as we already
know, from Proposition 5.2.
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In this approximation, every subproblem solves just one shortest-path problem.
Actually, approximation algorithm HI is a decomposition for the deterministic
interdiction problem with dk replaced by dkpk = dkEsk . Therefore, we can apply the
Algorithm 2E or Algorithm 3 with the Local_Search procedure established for the
deterministic case. The running time of the approximation HI (without the evaluation of
the exact objective function of the candidate solution; see principle (i) above) should be
roughly the same as the running time for the deterministic interdiction algorithms.
Algorithm H2
As a refinement to HI, the modified objective of approximation H2 assumes that
the follower knows the original interdiction plan, all success probabilities and also (and
this is the difference between HI and H2) the number of successful interdictions.
However, the follower does not know which specific arcs were interdicted successfully.
Given an interdiction plan x , let n be the number of interdiction attempts. For m
= 0,...,n, p(m\x) is the probability that x results in m successful interdictions. Let
d™ = E[skdk \m,x\. Hence, ck +xkdk is the expected length of arc k given x and m.
Let y
2
'
m (x)be the shortest s-t path in the network with these arc lengths. Now, for all
interdiction plans x, define the deterministic reply strategy by y^(s) = y
2
'
m
^
s
'
x) (x) for
all sg5 where m(s,x) if the number of successful interdictions x causes given outcome
s . By Corollary 5.1 we have established an approximation algorithm H2.
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In this approximation, every subproblem solves just n shortest-path problems.
(Notice that v2'°(x) is the shortest s-t path with no interdiction, which is independent of
x.) However, we need to calculate //m) (x) and d™ . When pk = p for every k eA,
//
m) (x) can be calculated directly from the binomial distribution, and the fact that
TTl
d™ - — dk . When different arcs may have different probabilities /ty, these parameters
n
can be calculated in 0{ \A
|
2
) time using the generating function
f(t)=Tl(ptt+a-pk)y
keA
Approximation H2 partitions the probability space according to the total number
of successful interdiction attempts. Other partitioning schemes may be used too. For
instance, a partition can be based on the success of a single interdiction, or on the number
of successes in a group of arcs, etc. Furthermore, an algorithm can start with a crude
partition and refine it later, until it reaches a desired optimality gap. This procedure is
called "sequential approximation" in the stochastic programming literature (e.g. Kail et al
1988) and it was used by Cormican et al. (1998) for solving a stochastic max-flow
network-interdiction problem. Algorithm H3 uses yet another partitioning scheme.
Algorithm H3
In this algorithm, the subproblem solves the shortest-path problem for a relatively
few, "most likely" outcomes, and bounds the shortest-path length at all other possible
outcomes, using the simple expected-value approach. Assume for instance that x
interdicts 10 arcs and the probability of success is 0.8 for every arc. Instead of solving
1024 shortest-path problems (as the exact decomposition algorithm would do), an
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approximation algorithm H3 of "enumeration depth" 2 solves only the cases where 8
(8 = 10- 2) or more of the arcs are successfully interdicted. There are only 56 such
outcomes but they cover about 68% of the probability space. Then, the approximation
bounds the shortest-path length in the remaining 968 outcomes by finding one shortest-
path which is optimal with respect to the average delays across those outcomes.
To establish approximation H3 of enumeration depth 2 formally, define the
following sets:
(a) S' is the set of all outcomes s with 2 or fewer failures in x , and
(b) S" is the set of all outcomes s with more than 2 failures in x.
Now, for all interdiction plans x, define the deterministic reply strategy by
y*(s) = y(x,s) for all seS', and by y*(s) = y
3 (x) for all s e S" , where y
3 (x) is the
shortest path with arcs lengths defined as E[ck + xkskdk \ s e S"] for all k eA
.
Example 5.1
This example demonstrates the way subproblems work in the exact decomposition
algorithm and in the three approximations suggested so far. Moreover, we later use this
example to motivate a possible improvement to approximation H3.
Assume that the interdictor interdicts 4 arcs, denoted by k\, k2, k3, and k4. There
are 24 = 16 possible outcomes and each is denoted by a four-digit binary number. For
instance, 1010 represents an outcome in which the interdiction of k\ and k3 are
successful and the interdiction ofk2 and k4 are not.
All the algorithms solve several shortest-path problems, each associated with a
specific possible outcomes, or an average of several outcomes (combined by an
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approximation algorithm). Figure 5.1 shows how the different algorithms partition these
16 possibilities. In the figure, every cell represents group of outcomes that the algorithm
links, and so every cell represents one shortest-path problem that the subproblem solves.
Exact Alg. Approx.
Alg. HI
Approx.
Alg. H2
Approx.
Alg. H3
(depth 2)
1111 1111
1110
1101
1011
0111
1100
1010
1001
0110
0101
0011
1000
0100
0010
0001
0000
1111 1111
1110 1110
1101
1011
0111
1110
1101 1101
1011 1011
0111 0111
1100 1100
1010
1001
0110
0101
0011
1100
1010 1010
1001 1001
0110 0110
0101 0101
0011 0011
1000 1000
0100
0010
0001
1000
0100
0010
0001
0000
0100
0010
0001
0000 0000
Figure 5.1: Given an interdiction plan with 4 attempts, every algorithm
for S-MXSP partitions the 16 possible outcomes into a different set of
"cells" (divided by horizontal lines), and solves one shortest-path
problem for each cell.
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Algorithm H4
In approximation H3, the reply strategy for each one of the outcomes in S" is the
same path, in particular, the path that is shortest on average over all outcomes in S" . (In
the example of Figure 5.1, S" is the large cell in the bottom of the list associated with
H3.) The main idea of approximation H4 is to use information about shortest-path
problems associated with outcomes in S' (in the example of Figure 5.1, those outcomes
that are in separate cells in the top part of the list associated with H3) to define a possibly
better reply strategy for outcomes in S" .
For instance, consider outcome 0100 in Example 5.1. Intuitively, it seems likely
that shortest paths that are associated with outcomes 1100, 0110 and 0101 are relatively
short paths with respect to outcome 0100. Given outcome 0100, none of these 3 paths is
necessarily the shortest path, but they may be better, i.e., shorter on average, than the
single path that is good on average with respect to all the outcomes in S" . In
approximation H4, the reply strategy for each of the outcomes in S" (the same set as in
H3) is a randomized combination of optimal replies to related outcomes in S'
.
To define precisely approximation H4 of enumeration depth 2, we first assume
that pk = p for all arcs k. Let n be the number of interdiction attempts for a given
interdiction plan x. For m = 0,...,n, p^m\x) is the probability that x results in m
successful interdictions (given by the binomial distribution), and Sm (x) is the set of all
outcomes with exactly m successful attempts in x . Now, given an interdiction plan x
,
we define the randomized reply strategy by defining
<f>- (y I s) for all s gS:
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>n-l/~\
, , c"~2(a) For all SG5"(x)u5"" 1 (x)u5n"z (x), let ^(y s) be 1 for y(x,s) and
otherwise.
(b) For m = 0,...,n-3 and all seSm (x) we first identify the
(
n
2
m
) elements of
-,«-2
S (x) where the same m attempts are successful too, denoted by
,1 „2 It)
s ,s ,...,s
v "
. (Out of the n-m interdiction failures in x corresponding to
s e5m (x), we need all combinations of two failures, each one corresponding to a
n-2,
different seS"" z (x).) Let,
0i(y|s)H
l/(B;
m
y ey^s 1),^2),...,^ 1 2 J
o otherwise
By Proposition 5.2 and Corollary 5.1, to establish an approximation algorithm
the subproblem must calculate £[y^.(x,5)] and E[skyk (x,s)] for all k&A. The
following proposition shows how that can be done with respect to our definitions of
approximation H4.
Proposition 5.3: In approximation algorithm H4 ofdepth 2, for all k e -A
,
[5.7] E[yk (x~s)] = Sym\x)£[^(x,5)|sE5m(x)]+2ym) (x)£[^(x^) seSn_2 (x)
m=n-2 m=0
[5.8] E[skyk (x,s)] = £/>
(m)
(x^i< [^(x^)|s eSm (x)
m=n-2
n-3
+ ^p(m\x)E[sk \s GSm (x)\E[yk (x,s)\s GSn
~ 2 (x),sk =1
m=0
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Proof: By definition, for all k eA
E\Sk&h] =f,p(m) (x)E[yk (x,~s)\sGSm (x)] and
OT=
E[skyk (x,~s)] = £//m) (x)2<[^(x,s)| S eSw (x)
m=0
and so it is enough to show that for all m<n-3 and for all k gA
E
E
yk (x,~s)\seS
m
] =E yk (x,s)\s eS*
1
"2
] and
**?*(*»*) se5ffl =E seSn
-2 (x),sk =l
But, these are straightforward results of our definition of the reply strategy in
approximation algorithm H4 of depth 2 and the assumption that pk = p for all k
Remark: We conjecture that a modified reply strategy can be defined such that
Proposition 5.3 holds even if the probability that an interdiction attempt is successful is
not the same for all interdictable arcs. That modified strategy needs to assign different
weight to different paths in the definition of the reply strategy for s e Sm
, m < n - 3 , in
order to keep [5.7] and [5.8] valid.
In order to calculate Efj^x^)] and E[skyk (5t,s)] for all k eA it is enough to
calculate the probability of each outcome s e Sn (x) u S"-1 (x) ^j Sn
~2 (x) , and to find the
shortest-path given this s, since for all k eA :
(a) 5>(W) (*) = 1- I>(m) (x),and
wj=0 m=n-2
(b)
n
f,p
(mHx)E[sk \s cS
m
(x)] = pk - fp(m)(^[i|s e5m (x)
nt=0 m=m-2
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D. A LOCAL-SEARCH PROCEDURE
Our experience with the different decomposition algorithms for solving the
deterministic MXSP, as well as preliminary computational results for S-MXSP (reported
later), indicate that the running time of the master problem is very sensitive to the number
of Benders cuts. In fact, even though the subproblem of S-MXSP requires more work
compared to the subproblem in MXSP, in both cases the limits of the decomposition
algorithms are determined by the difficulty in solving the master problems, at least with
our current technology.
In order to solve the problem with fewer master iterations (every iteration adds
one more Benders cut), the hybrid algorithm can use a local-search procedure to generate
more than one covering cut per iteration. Those cuts are added to the master problem,
and tighten it. This discussion suggests that a local-search procedure may also be helpful
for the different decomposition algorithms (exact or approximate) for S-MXSP. We
describe a possible local-search procedure for the exact decomposition algorithm.
However, the same approach may be use to develop a local-search procedure for all the
approximation algorithms, too.
Let y$(s) be any reply strategy, deterministic or randomized, that the subproblem
can define given interdiction plan x . It may be, for instance, that y^ (s) is the second
shortest path given x and s , or the second shortest path in the list of paths generated by
our Local_Search procedure we described for MXSP. Then, by Proposition 5.2 we can
define c(x)- ^E[cky(x,sk )] and vk (x) = dkE[skyk (x,s)], to obtain the valid
keA
Benders cut z < c(x) + ;T v^x);^ But, as we discussed earlier, too many Benders cut is
keA
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not a good idea. Therefore, the local-search procedure might only generate a covering
cut based on this (slack) Benders cut, and add it to the master problem. (If c(x) exceeds
the current value of z , we will not include this cut in the master problem, but rather, as in
Algorithm 2E for MXSP, put it aside for possible later use.)
For instance, suppose we choose yk (x,s) as the second shortest path given x and
s . Then, when we compute the exact Benders cut we also find the second shortest path
in each of the subproblems. Those second shortest paths are used to compute a slack cut,
and the covering cut associated with this slack cut is added to the master problem. Note
that we can generate more than one slack cut per iteration by finding additional paths for
every subproblem.
E. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE
To test the different algorithms, we use the shortest-path network and
computational platform described in Chapter II. However, a new vector p is added,
where pk is the probability an interdiction attempt on arc k is successful. For the results
reported here, we use the same success probability for every arc, denoted hyp.
The following tables summarize the results for several different cases. We note
that these are preliminary results and that none of the algorithms includes a local-search
procedure. Thus, the exact and approximation decompositions are accomplished with
Algorithm 1. In the case of approximation HI, we could have used the Local_Search
procedure developed for deterministic network interdiction (that might have reduced its
running time significantly, as seen in Chapter II) but we did not, in order to allow a fair
comparison between this algorithm and the others.
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Table 5.1 compares approximation HI, approximation H2 and the exact
algorithm. In both approximations we use a 1% approximation gap, but, as the table
shows, that translates to a 12-20% true optimality gap for our test problems. (See
principles (f) and (i) in Section 5.C) for the definitions of approximation gap and
optimality gap.)
We solve the same problems with the exact algorithm up to a 12% or 15%
optimality gap. Table 5.1 shows that the exact algorithm has similar running times to the
approximations for this parameter setting. But, since computational effort in the exact
algorithm is clearly more sensitive to the total amount of interdiction resource (we do not
see this in the table because ro is relatively small), the approximation algorithm would
probably outperform the exact algorithm with larger values of tq. In any case, the
running times indicate that we cannot successfully increase ro significantly, even in the
approximations, without adding a local-search procedure or other effective enhancement.
H2 takes much more running time than HI, but yields a similar optimality gap.
The major disadvantage of H2 is in the master problem level (the extra work in the
subproblem is insignificant here.) The cuts in the master problem ofH2 are less effective
(compare the number of iterations the two algorithms need for convergence, Nh2 versus
Nhi), probably because every cut in H2 represents a weighted combination of multiple s-t
paths, and not a single path. Thus, in the cuts ofH2 the non-zero coefficients are smaller
on average, and so the cuts are "flatter," (in the geometric sense) compared to the cuts in
HI. (Notice that each cut in the exact algorithm is a weighted combination of many s-t
paths and so is even flatter. As a result, the exact algorithm requires more iterations to
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achieve a 12% gap, than approximations HI and H2 need to achieve a 1% approximation
gap, which is actually 1% optimality gap with respect to the modified objective.)
Note also that:
(a) The optimality gap of both approximations HI and H2 becomes smaller, though
not small enough, when/? increases, and
(b) The optimality gap of all approximations increases when we have more
interdiction resource.
(c) For the case/? = 0.7 and ro = 15 (problem set IS), we used the exact algorithm to
solve the same problem to a 2% optimality gap. It turns out that the optimality
gap obtained by the approximation algorithms (and the exact algorithm when used
with a 15% gap) depends primarily on poor upper bounds rather than poor
interdiction plans x. About 20% of the gap is due to the difference between the
optimal objective value and the lower bound (i.e., the objective value of the
incumbent solution), while the weak upper bound is responsible for 80% of the
gap-
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Approximation HI Approximation H2 Exact Algorithm
Problem P ro LBH i UBH1 %gH1 TH . NH i LBH2 TJBH2 %gH2 Th2 Nh2 LBE UBE %gE TE NE
IS 0.7 15 17.8 21.0 18.3 15 20 17.8 20.8 16.5 38 33 18.0 20.6 15 14 22
2S 0.7 20 18.4 22.0 20.1 84 33 18.4 21.8 18.6 243 54 18.5 21.3 15 87 37
3S 0.8 15 18.8 21.2 12.6 21 24 18.8 21.1 12.3 36 21 18.9 21.0 12 39 32
4S 0.8 20 19.5 22.5 15.6 102 39 19.5 22.4 14.4 266 53 19.5 21.7 12 255 60
Table 5.1: Computational results for S-MXSP. The test network has 64=8x8 inner nodes (a=238), c=10, d=\0
and r=5. The approximation gap for HI and H2 is 1%.
Legend: LBA Lower bound achieved by Algorithm h.
XJBh Upper bound achieved by Algorithm h.
%gh True optimality gap achieved by the Algorithm h.
Th Running time in CPU seconds for Algorithm h.
N/, Number of iterations for Algorithm h.
Table 5.2 compares approximation H3, approximation H4 and the exact
algorithm (both approximations are of enumeration depth 2). We solve the exact
algorithm with 5% and 10% optimality gaps, and in order to obtain similar results we set
the approximation gap to 1% and 4% in H3, and to 4% and 8% in H4.
The table shows that approximation H3 cannot establish small optimality gaps. In
problems 7S we solve approximation H3 with a 1% approximation gap but obtain an 8%
true optimality gap. On the same problems, approximation H4 with a 4% approximation
gap yields a true optimality gap of 6.5%. Thus, approximation H4 estimates the reply to
outcomes with 3 or more failures better than approximation H3, and so the modified
objective ofH4 is closer in its value to the optimal objective.
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Table 5.2 also demonstrates, just as Table 5.1, that the approximations and exact
algorithm have similar running times, when the exact algorithm is solved with a similar
true optimality gap. But, with increased ro the approximations would probably
outperform the exact algorithm.
Approximation H3 Approximation H4 Exact Algorithm
Prob. P n %g LBhs UBm %gro Tffi Nm %g LBH4 UBh4 %gH4 TH4 Nh4 LBe UBe %gE TE NE
5S 0.75 15 4.0 18.4 20.5 11.1 87 57 8.0 18.5 20.4 10.2 61 50 18.4 20.2 10 74 46
6S 0.75 20 4.0 19.2 21.9 14.5 200 73 8.0 19.1 21.3 11.8 567 97 19.1 21.0 10 550 87
7S 0.75 15 1.0 18.5 20.0 8.0 333 197 4.0 18.5 19.7 6.5 352 117 18.6 19.5 5 344 107
Table 5.2: Computational results for S-MXSP. The test network has 64=8x8 inner nodes (o=238),
c=10, rf=10andr=5.
Legend: %g Approximation gap.
All other legend data as in Table 5.1
F. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have shown how our approach for solving deterministic
system-interdiction problems can be extended to solve one type of stochastic system-
interdiction problem. We revisited the shortest-path network-interdiction problem to
demonstrate this, but this time assumed that interdiction success is uncertain. As
expected, the stochastic problem is much more difficult to solve than the deterministic
one, mainly because the subproblems in our decomposition algorithm generate "flat"
cuts, and so the master problem requires more iterations to converge. Surprisingly, this is
even true for an exact algorithm with exponential complexity in the subproblems. From
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our experience with the deterministic interdiction problem (and the shortest-path
network-defense problem) we know that a local-search procedure will likely accelerate
the decomposition algorithms for the stochastic problems, but we have not yet
implemented such a procedure.
We compared the exact decomposition algorithm to several approximation
(decomposition) algorithms. On our test problems, the exact and approximation
algorithms require similar running times (when the problem is solved to the same
optimality gap) but in larger problems the approximations are likely to be better, because
they don't require an exponential amount ofwork in the subproblem phase.
Among the approximations, algorithm H4 gives the best results. For a given
optimality gap, running times for approximation H4 are similar to those of the other
approximations, and of all the approximations tested, approximation H4 establishes the
smallest optimality gaps. Approximation H4 finds the optimal reply of the network user
for the most likely outcomes out of the interdiction attempts, and use that to approximate
(and bound) the optimal network user replies for all other outcomes.
Last, we note that our approach for solving S-MXSP can be easily applied to
other interdiction problems, where the success of each interdiction attempt is uncertain.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviews the accomplishments of this dissertation and suggests
opportunities for further research.
In this dissertation we have discussed several problems concerning system
interdiction and defense, using a shortest-path network-interdiction scenario to
demonstrate our approach. We have addressed the following questions:
(a) What is the best interdiction plan?
(b) What is the best defense plan against a prospective set of interdictions?
(c) What is the best interdiction plan when interdiction attempts might fail?
The deterministic shortest-path network-interdiction problem (MXSP) is
discussed in Chapter II. MXSP assumes that a network user traverses a shortest path
given the results of a prior interdiction, and the question is "What interdiction plan will
maximize the length of that shortest path?" When interdiction of an arc increases its
effective length by a finite amount (called "delay"), and the network user traverses the
shortest path given the interdiction, we have shown how to formulate the problem as a
mixed-integer program (MTP), and how to solve the problem with Benders
decomposition. However, when interdiction of an arc makes the arc impassable, those
solution techniques can be ineffective, and we therefore devised a second decomposition
algorithm, in which the Benders master problem is replaced by a set-covering problem.
Last, we combined the first two decomposition algorithms into a hybrid decomposition
algorithm which gives the best computational results. All tests were performed on
randomly generated networks, it would be interesting to repeat those tests on more
realistic problems.
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The hybrid algorithm includes several special enhancements, derived through the
first two decomposition algorithms, especially (/') integrality cuts for the Benders master
problem along with a method to tighten those cuts, and, (if) covering constraints—which
are best viewed as integrality cuts in this context—and a method to generate and lift
them. Those enhancements were shown to be effective for solving MXSP. It would be
interesting, when delays are finite, to see if the integrality cuts and/or covering
constraints derived from the decompositions would be useful as (integrality) cuts for
reducing solution times for MXSP solved as a MIP. It might also be possible to add
some constraints, possibly aggregated, from the MIP to the decomposition master
problems to tighten their relaxations and thereby improve solution times.
In Chapter HI we showed how the techniques used to solve the shortest-path
network-interdiction problem can be used for solving other interdiction problems where
an interdictor tries to reduce the effectiveness of an adversary's system through
interdiction. Thus, our methods can be used to interdict a shortest-path system with side
constraints, disrupt activities in a PERT network in order to maximize project completion
time, reduce the effectiveness of an economic system modeled as an optimization
problem, etc.
In a wider perspective, the special enhancements we suggest for the basic master
problem in Benders decomposition, i.e., the integrality and covering cuts, may be helpful
while applying Benders decomposition to other problems with binary "complicating"
variables. Consider, for example, a problem of the design and operation of a production
and distribution system. These problems often involve (/') "strategic variables," which
constitute binary decisions over facility locations and other issues of infrastructure, and,
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(if) "operational variables," usually assumed continuous. A common way of solving
those problems is through Benders decomposition (e.g., Brown et al. 1987), where the
subproblem is a (relatively simple) operational problem and the master problem deals
with the binary strategic variables. It might be possible to improve running times of such
decompositions by adding the integrality cuts and/or covering constraints to the Benders
master problem, as was done with MXSP.
In Chapter IV we discussed a system-defense problem in which the system user
can defend some of his activities, resources, etc., against prospective interdiction. The
system-defense problem turns out to be a system-interdiction problem in itself, where the
defender interdicts the interdictor's system. This view leads us to solve the problem of
defending the shortest path (in this problem the network user defends some of the arcs in
a shortest-path network and afterward the interdictor finds the best interdiction plan on
the undefended arcs of the network) with nested decomposition algorithms. The
algorithms we use include the enhancements developed for MXSP (and adapted for more
general system-interdiction problems) and special procedures that take advantage of the
structure of the nested decomposition. It would be interesting and challenging to apply
the nested decomposition algorithm to other system-defense problems, too.
In Chapter V we showed how our approach for solving deterministic system-
interdiction problems can be extended to solve a shortest-path network-interdiction
problem where interdiction success is uncertain, and the interdictor wishes to maximizes
the average length of the post-interdiction shortest path. Even this "simple" stochastic
scenario is much more difficult to solve exactly compared to the deterministic analog
because evaluating the expected shortest-path length, given an interdiction plan, requires
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exponential work.
To deal with the complexity of the stochastic problem we devised several
decomposition algorithms that approximate the expected length of the shortest path after
interdiction. In these algorithms, the subproblems involve only at a subset of the possible
outcomes, or aggregate several outcomes together, so that the number of scenarios
considered by the subproblem is manageable. Those approximations yield upper bounds
on the optimal objective value. A lower bound can be found, when computationally
feasible, by calculating the exact objective value (i.e., by considering all possible
scenarios) for one feasible interdiction plan. A good feasible interdiction plan (one that is
likely to give a good lower bound) is often suggested by the near-exact solution of the
approximation.
Our limited computational experience includes only the basic Benders
decomposition for the exact and approximating algorithms. Unfortunately, the
subproblems for any of these algorithms generate "flat" cuts, and such cuts cause the
master problem to require more iterations to converge compared to analogous
deterministic problems. Our computational tests show that all algorithms can have similar
running times for the same optimality gap. However, with increased interdiction
resources, the approximations are likely to outperform the exact algorithm. Further
programming work is needed to check the effectiveness of the integrality cuts and the
other basic decomposition algorithms in this stochastic scenario; these techniques might
help compensate for the problematic flat cuts.
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Our model assumes uncertainty only with respect to the success of each
interdiction attempt, but other types of uncertainty might be important as well. For
instance, in a shortest-path interdiction problem, the interdictor might not know the exact
length of certain arcs, the exact location of the source and target nodes, etc. More work is
needed to accommodate these variations of the model.
Among the approximation algorithms, of special interest is an algorithm that finds
the shortest paths with respect to the most likely scenarios and uses those to approximate
(and bound) the shortest path with respect to all other outcomes. This algorithm seems to
give the best results but correctness is only proven for the case in which all arc
interdiction-success probabilities are equal.
The approximation algorithms take advantage of the special structure of the
stochastic network-interdiction problem, in particular, the fact that first-level variables
(interdiction decisions) affect only the cost of the second-level activities. (In a shortest
path problem the cost of traversing an arc is the arc's length). However, the same
structure can be found in other stochastic programming problems. Consider a stochastic
programming problem of the form
max £[/(*)]
T
where /(x) = max c y
yeY
s.t. A Ty<d+Bx
where B = diag(b) . For instance, this might be a production problem where:
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(a) The variables x are binary decisions regarding which markets to expand.
(b) The demand at facilityj is the original demand dj plus the stochastic result of the
market expansion bjXj . (Xj = implies no change in marketj.)
(c) All other parameters (production capabilities and costs, shipping costs, etc.) are
deterministic.
If we take the dual of the inner maximization, we obtain a max-min problem with the
same structure as the stochastic system-interdiction problems we have solved. Thus, this
problem can be solved with the approximation algorithms we have devised.
This thesis contributes mostly to the areas of system interdiction and defense, but
our techniques may be helpful in other applications solved by Benders decomposition
including certain stochastic-programming problems. Our results should provide ample
opportunities for further research in all of these areas.
-104
LIST OF REFERENCES
R. K. Ahuja, T. L. Magnanti and J. B. Orlin, 1993. Network Flows, Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
C. Alexopoulos, 1997. "State space partitioning methods for stochastic shortest path
network," Networks 30, 9-21.
G. Anandalingam and V. Apprey, 1991. "Multi-level programming and conflict
resolution," European Journal ofOperations Research 51, 233-247.
G. Anandalingam and D. White, 1990. "A solution method for the linear static
Stackelberg problem using penalty functions," IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
35, 1170-1173.
M. O. Ball, B. L. Golden and R. V. Vohra, 1989. "Finding the most vital arcs in a
network," Operations Research Letters 8, 73-76.
J. Bard, 1984. "Optimality conditions for the bi-level programming problem," Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly 31, 13-26.
J. Bard, 1991. "Some properties of the bi-level programming problem," Journal of
Optimization Theory and Applications 68, 371-378.
J. Bard and J. Falk, 1982. "An explicit solution to the multi-level programming problem,"
Computers and Operations Research 9, 77-100.
J. Bard and J. Moore, 1990. "A branch and bound algorithm for the bi-level programming
problem," SIAMJournal on Scientific and Statistical Computing 11, 281-292.
J. Bard and J. Moore, 1992. "An algorithm for the discrete bi-level programming
problem," Naval Research Logistics 39, 419-435.
-105
E. M. L. Beale, 1959. "On quadratic programming," Naval Research Logistic Quartely 6,
227-243.
J. E. Beasley, 1990. "A lagrangian heuristic for set-covering problems," Naval Research
Logistics 37, 151-164.
O. Ben-Ayed, 1993. "Bi-level linear programming," Computers and Operations
Research 20, 485-501.
O. Ben-Ayed, D. Boyce and C. Blair, 1988. "A general bi-level linear programming
formulation of the network design problem," Transportation Research 22 B, 3 1 1-3 18.
O. Ben-Ayed and C. Blair, 1990. "Computational difficulties of bi-level linear
programming," Operations Research 38, 556-560.
J. F. Benders, 1962. "Partioning procedures for solving mixed integer variables
programming problems," Numerische Mathematik 4, 238-252.
W. Bialas and M. Karwan, 1984. "Two-level linear programming," Management Science
30, 1004-1020.
J. Bracken and J. McGill, 1973. "Defense applications of mathematical programs with
optimization problems in the constraints," Operations Research 22, 1086-1096.
G. G. Brown, G. W. Graves and M. D. Honczarenko, 1987. "Design and operation of a
multicommodity production/distribution system using primal goal decomposition,"
Management Science 33, 1469-1480.
W. Candler and R. Townsley, 1993. "A linear two-level programming problem,"
Computers and Operations Research 9, 59-76.
A. Caprara, M. Fischetti and P. Toth, 1996. "A heuristic algorithm for the set covering
problem," in Lecture Notes on Computer Science, Vol. 1084, Integer Programming and
Combinatorial Optimization, W. H. Cunningham, S. T. McCormick and M. Queyranne,
editors, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 72-81.
106
M. S. Chern and K. C. Lin, 1995. "Interdicting the activities of a linear program - A
parametric analysis," European Journal ofOperational Research 86, 580-591.
H. W. Corely and D. Y. Sha, 1982. "Most vital links and nodes in weighted networks,"
Operation Research Letters 1, 157-160.
K. J. Cormican, 1995. "Computational methods for deterministic and stochastic network
interdiction problems," Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California.
K. J. Cormican, D. P. Morton and R. K. Wood, 1998. "Stochastic network interdiction,"
Operations Research 46, 184-197.
J. Falk, 1973. "A linear max-min problem," Mathematical Programming S, 169-188.
J. Falk and J. Liu, 1995. "On bi-level programming, Part I: General nonlinear case,"
Mathematical Programming 70, 47-72.
G. S. Fishman, 1985. "Estimating network characteristics in stochastic activity network,"
Management Science 31, 579-593.
J. Fortuny-Amat and B. McCarl, 1981. "A representation and economic interpretation of
a two-level programming problem," Journal of Operational Research Society 32, 783-
792.
D. R. Fulkerson and G. C. Harding, 1977. "Maximizing the minimum source-sink path
subject to a budget constraint," Mathematical Programming 13, 116-118.
R. S. Garfinkel and G. L. Nemhauser, 1972, Integer Programming, John Wiley & Sons,
New York.
M. Gendreau, P. Marcotte and G. Savard, 1996. "A hybrid tabu-ascent algorithm for the
linear bi-level programming problem," Journal ofGlobal Optimization 8, 217-233.
107-
A.M. Geoffrion and G. W. Graves, 1974. "Multicommodity distribution system design by
Benders decomposition," Management Science 20, 822-844.
P. M. Ghare, D. C. Montgomery and T. M. Turner, 1971. "Optimal interdiction policy for
a flow network," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 18, 37-45.
B. Golden, 1978. "A problem in network interdiction," Naval Research Logistics
Quarterly 25, 711-713.
M. Grotschel, C. Monma and M. Stoer, 1992. "Computational results with a cutting plane
algorithm for designing communication networks with low-connectivity constraints,"
Operation Research 40, 309-330.
P. Hansen, B. Jaumard and G. Savard, 1992. "New branch-and-bound rules for linear bi-
level programming," SIAM Journal on Scientific and Statistical Computing 13, 1194-
1217.
ILOG 1997. Using the CPLEX callable library version 5.0. ILOG Inc. CPLEX Division,
Incline Village, Nevada.
J. J. Judice and A. M. Faustino, 1992. "A sequential LCP method for bilevel linear
programming," Annals ofOperation Research 34, 89-106.
P. Kail, A. Ruszczyriski and K. Frauendorfer, 1988. "Approximation techniques in
stochastic programming," in Y. Ermoliev and R. J. Wets (eds.) Numerical Tecniquesfor
Stochastic Programming, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 33-64.
N. Katoh, T. Ibaraki and H. Mine, 1982. "An efficient algorithm for the k shortest simple
paths," Networks 12, 41 1-427.
L. LeBlanc and D. Boyce, 1986. "A bilevel programming algorithm for exact solution of
the network design problem with user-optimal flows," Transportation Research 20B,
259-265.
-108-
Y. Liu and T. Spencer, 1995. "Solving a bi-level linear program when the inner decision
maker controls few variables," European Journal ofOperational Research 81, 644-65 1
.
Z.-Q. Luo and J.-S. Pang and D. Ralph, 1996. Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium
Constraints, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
A. W. McMasters and T. M. Mustin, 1970. "Optimal interdiction of a supply network,"
Naval Research Logistic Quarterly 17, 261-268.
K. Malik, A. K. Mittal and S. K. Gupta, 1989. "The £-most vital arcs in the shortest path
problem," Operation Research Letters 8, 223-227.
D. Medhi, 1994. "A unified approach to network survivability for teletrafFic networks:
models, algorithms and analysis," IEEE Transactions on Communication 42, 534-548.
J. Moore and J. Bard, 1990. "The mixed integer linear bi-level programming problem,"
Operations Research 38, 91 1-921
.
D. P. Morton and R. K. Wood, 1999. "Restricted-recourse bounds for stochastic linear
programming," Operation Research, to appear.
G. L. Nemhauser and L. A. Wolsey, 1988. Integer and Combinatorial Optimization,
Wiley-Interscience, New York.
H. Onal, 1993. "A modified simplex approach for solving bi-level programming
problems," European Journal ofOperational Research 67, 1 26- 135.
M. Simaan and J.B. Cruz, 1973. "On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games,"
Journal ofOptimization Theory andApplications 11, 533-555.
H. A. Taha, 1975. Integer Programming, Academic Press, New York.
*s
109
H. Vaish and C. M. Shetty, 1977. "A cutting plane algorithm for the bilinear
programming problem," Naval Research Logistic Quarterly 24, 83-94.
L. Vicente and P. Calamai, 1994. "Bi-level and multilevel programming: A bibliography
review," Journal ofGlobal Optimization 5, 291-306.
L. Vicente, G. Savard and J. Judice, 1996. "Discrete linear bi-level programming
problem," Journal of Optimization Theory andApplications 89, 597-614.
A. Washburn and K. Wood, 1994. "Two-person zero-sum games for network
interdiction," Operations Research 43, 243-251.
U. Wen and S. Hsu, 1991. "Linear bi-level programming problems - a review," Journal
ofthe Operational Research Society 42, 125-133.
U. Wen and Y. Yang, 1990. "Algorithms for solving the mixed integer two-level linear
programming problem," Computers and Operations Research 17, 133-142.
The White House, Executive Order 13010, July 15, 1996.
R. K. Wood, 1993. "Deterministic network interdiction," Mathematical and Computer
Modeling 11, 1-18.
110
APPENDIX A. BI-LEVEL LINEAR PROGRAMMING
The system interdiction problem is a min-max, mixed integer, bi-level linear
program. In this appendix we introduce the definitions of a general bi-level linear
problem and its max-min and mixed-integer variants. The focus of the discussion is on
existing algorithms for bi-level problems, and their applicability to the special structure
of the system interdiction problem.
A. BI-LEVEL LINEAR PROGRAMMING
The general Bi-Level Linear Program (BLLP) has attracted much attention in the
last 30 years (e.g., the literature survey in Vicente and Calamai 1994, the reviews in Ben-
Ayed 1993, and Wen and Hsu 1991). Many algorithms have been suggested to solve the
BLLP and the model has been applied to a number real-world problems. Nonlinear cases
are treated in a few papers (e.g., Falk and Liu 1995) and recently, the more general case,
where part of the variables are set as a function of the others through any type of
equilibrium constraints, is explored too (Luo, Pang and Ralph 1996).
A bi-level program considers two decision-makers, or players, who may be
competitive. Each player controls some activities and wishes to optimize his objective
function, which is a function of all the activities, including those that the second player
controls. The problem can be viewed as a non-zero-sum game where one of the players,
the leader, plays first. Due to common constraints, the actions of the leader influence the
feasible region of the second player, the follower. In his turn, the follower optimizes his
objective function, in view of the decisions of the leader, but independent of the leader's
objective function. We assume perfect information, that is, the leader knows the
objective function and the constraints of the follower and hence can predict the follower's
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reaction to any decision he makes.
The mathematical programming formulation ofBLLP is:
[BL] min c, rx + c2
r
y
xeX,yeY(x)
where X = {x\Dx<d,x> 0}, and
Y(x) = {y|yeargmin c3ry
s.t. ^y<b-fix
y^o }
Note that there is no need for a term like c4
r
x in the follower's program because
x is a parameter there, not a variable.
Y(x) is called the follower's rational reaction set. It is assumed that Y(x) is non-
empty for all xgX. The inducible region is defined as IR = { (x,y) | Dx < d, x > 0, y <=
Y(x) }. With this notation, we can rewrite [BL] as
[BL1] min{ c/x + c2ry |(x,y) eIR}.
The feasible region to [BL1] may not be convex. Therefore, the problem can be
difficult to solve and may have local optima. However, let S be the feasible region of
[BL], i.e., S = { (x,y) | Dx < d, Ay + Bx < b, x > 0, y > 0}. Then, there is a solution of
the problem that is a vertex of S (Bard 1984). As we shall see, many algorithms try to
take advantage of that result by performing an implicit search of all possible solutions
without enumerating all extreme points of S.
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B. THE LINEAR MIN-MAX PROBLEM
[LSIP] without the binary constraints is a special case of [BL] with q = and
c2 = -c3 . It is also referred to as the Linear Min-Max Problem (LMN):
[LMN] min cry
xeX,yeY(x)
where X = {x\Dx<d,x> 0}, and
Y(x) ={y\Ay<b-Bx,y>0}.
Remark: In [BL], If 7(x) is not always a singleton, and c2
ry might not have the same
value for all y e 7(x), then a solution to [BL] may not exist (Bard 1991). However, in
[LMN], Cj = and so c 2
r
y has the same value for all y e 7(x). Thus, when 7(x) is
bounded for all xgX, an optimal bounded solution for [LMN] must exist.
LMN is equivalent to a structured quadratic problem. Hence, any nonlinear
algorithm is a candidate solution method. However, this quadratic objective formulation
is non-convex and the problem is, consequently, difficult to solve. To see the
equivalence, take the dual of the follower's problem in [LMN] (w are the dual variables)
to obtain:
[LMN1] min (b-Bx)rw = w rb-
w
r5x
x,w
s.t. Dx < d
A Tw >c
x > 0, w > 0.
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C. THE BI-LEVEL MIXED-INTEGER PROBLEM
The problem we are interested in, system interdiction, falls into the category of
the Bi-LevelMixedInteger Program (BLMIP). Let Sx and Sy represent the binary, and/or
integer and/or non-negativity restrictions on the values of the variables x and y,
respectively. Then, the formulation of BLMIP is the same as [BL] except that xeSx
replaces x > and yeSy replaces y > :
[BLMIP] min Ci rx + c2 ry
xeX,yeY(x)
where X = {x \Dx < d, x zSx}, and
Y(x) ={y |y eargmin c3 ry
s.t. Ay<b-Bx
yesY }
In the system interdiction scenario, Sx a {0,
1
}" while Sycz-R"' and closed (i.e.,
all the follower's variables are continuous). The general definition ofBLMIP is more
flexible, however.
D. APPLICATIONS
The ability of the BLLP model to represent decentralized decision processes,
where several different objective functions are incorporated simultaneously, has attracted
practitioners during the last 30 years. However, the difficulty in solving BLLP constrains
the number of actual applications and few models have passed beyond theoretical
formulation. Furthermore, in a recent review of the BLLP literature, it is stated that "the
overwhelming majority of real-world problems are formulated and solved as single level
programs even when they are virtually bi-level (Ben-Ayed 1993)."
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Most of the models and work in the area of involve BLLPs with economic
interpretations (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981). The upper level (leader) is the
government, or the head of an organization, that controls resources, or policy measures
such as prices, taxes and subsidies. The lower level (follower) is the private sector, or the
lower level of the organization, which optimizes its own objective function, after the
higher level sets the rules. Actual work in this area includes agricultural planning,
regulation of the oil industry and the imperfect cartel in the international coal market.
For a list of references see Vicente and Calamai (1994) and Ben-Ayed (1993).
The BLLP model has also been applied to network-design problems for
transportation and communication networks. The two-level formulation takes into
account the reaction of users to the improvements made in the system and hence can lead
to a better plan for the system manager (e.g., LeBlanc and Boyce 1986, Ben-Ayed, Boyce
and Blair 1988).
As one might expect, military models involving worst-case analysis through max-
min formulations were popular during the arms race (e.g., Bracken and McGill 1973).
However, the models, based on weapons attrition theory, are non-linear, and typically the
leader's activities do not change the follower's feasible region. Therefore the solution
approach taken there is not applicable to LSEP.
In the LMN framework, we are familiar with two military-oriented applications:
(a) Max-flow network interdiction (e.g., Wood 1993).
(b) Shortest-path network interdiction (Golden 1978, Fulkerson and Harding 1977).
In Chapter II we discuss in details a version of this problem, in which
interdiction decisions are binary, and not continuous, variables.
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E. ALGORITHMS FOR LMN AND BLLP
Currently, few algorithms exist that take advantage of the special structure of
LMN. On the other hand, any of the many algorithms that were suggested for BLLP can
be used to solve LMN as well (Bard and Falk 1982). These algorithms are of interest
because:
(a) We can relax the binary constraints ofLSIP if all the extreme points of the leader's
feasible region are binary. Thus, in some cases, an algorithm for BLLP (or LMN)
solves LSIP directly. Also,
(b) As we shall see later, most of the existing algorithms for mixed-integer problems
like LSIP incorporate a continuous-BLLP algorithm to solve sub-problems.
Some of the BLLP algorithms are not well-suited to solving LMNs. As we said
earlier, the LMN is a special case of BLLP with c2 = -c3 and cx = . The correlation
(in the usual statistical meaning) between c 2 and c3 is therefore -1 for the LMN.
Significantly, most of the existing algorithms for BLLP are positive in the sense that the
algorithm works best when there is a strong positive correlation between c2 and c3 , i.e.,
when the objective functions of the leader and the follower are similar, with respect to the
follower's variables. A positive algorithm is likely to have poor performance when
applied to LMN. To solve LMN, we shall use a non-positive algorithm, i.e., an algorithm
that performs well when there is a strong negative correlation between c2 and c3 .
While describing the existing algorithms for LMN and BLLP next, we classify
each one as positive or non-positive. The classification is based on algorithmic structure
and is by no means precise, but, in some of the cases, reported computational experience
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also supports our classification. However, unless mentioned specifically, experience with
large problems has not been reported.
1. Implicit Enumeration of Possible Bases
Recall that S is the joint feasible region of the two levels in [BL] and that there is
an optimal solution at a vertex of S. A few algorithms try to use this result by implicit
enumeration of the bases of the polytope that defines S. Usually, the algorithm starts by
letting the leader control all the variables in order to find his optimal solution over the
vertices of S, regardless of the follower's objective. Fixing the leader's variables, the
algorithm solves the follower's problem to determine if the solution is in the inducible
region. If it is, we have reached the optimal solution. Otherwise, we can conclude that
the basis, or the vertex, that the leader chose is not optimal. Several approaches have
been suggested to continue the search over 6"s vertices:
(a) A branch-and-bound process can be used where each new branch is a sub-problem
with one of the basic (and positive) variables from the leader's current basis forced to
0. This algorithm was originally suggested for LMN (Falk 1973).
(b) One variant examines only the follower's bases (Candler and Townsley 1982).
Strictly speaking, this algorithm is polynomial when the follower controls a constant
number of variables (Liu and Spencer 1993), but it becomes computationally unusable
when the number of those variables grows to even modest levels.
(c) The "Kth-best" algorithm (Bialas and Karwan 1982) repeatedly finds solutions for the
leader, regardless of the follower's objective, until the Kth best happens to be in the
inducible region.
All of the algorithms just mentioned are positive algorithms because the leader's
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objective is favored and in each major step the leader controls all the variables. These
algorithms cannot be efficient in case of large LMN or LSIP problems.
2. Cutting-Plane Algorithm (Vaish and Shetty 1977)
This algorithm works on the [LMN1] formulation. First it iterates (with
appropriate degeneracy-prevention rules) between the x and w variables until a stationary
point, that may only be only locally optimal, is achieved. Then it computes how far it can
move from the extreme point in any feasible direction (with respect to the leader's
variables) without improving the objective function, wrb - wr£x , cuts this part from X,
and starts again. This algorithm works on the LMN problem, but not the BLLP. (BLLP
doesn't fit into formulation [LMN1].) Hence, we classify it as a non-positive algorithm.
3. Branch-and-Bound on KKT Complimentary Conditions (Bard and
Moore 1990)
The "BB-KKT algorithm" replaces the follower's problem with his KKT
optimality conditions. This way, the BLLP is converted to a single-level problem, and a
branch-and-bound procedure is used to implicitly examine all combinations of the non-
linear complementary slackness conditions. Let w be the vector of dual variables
associated with the constraints Ay + Bx< b. Then, the KKT-formulation ofBLLP is:
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[BL2] min
x,y,w
T T
Cj x + c2 y
s.t. Dx <d
Ay + Bx <b
A Tvf >c
(^ rw-c3 )
r
y =
(Ay + Bx-b) T w =
x>0, y>0, w>0.
Random problems with 40 constraints and 100 variables, 40 of them controlled by
the follower, were solved by Bard and Moore, in 300 CPU seconds on average, on an
IBM 308 1-D. The main factor that increases the CPU time is the number of variables
controlled by the follower. This result is expected since this is clearly a positive
algorithm: In any relaxed iteration of the branch-and-bound process, the "BB-KKT"
algorithm controls the leader's and follower's variables together.
4. Penalty on Duality Gap (Anandalingam and White 1990)
Here, the BLLP is transformed into a single-level program by replacing the
follower's problem with a penalty on his duality gap (or equivalently, with a penalty on
the complimentary slackness conditions in formulation [BL2]). The reformulation of
BLLP is:
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[BL3] min c
1
r
x + c2
7y-&(c3 7'y- wr(b- Bx))
x,y,w
s.t. Dx <d
Ay + Bx < b
w TA > c3
x>0,y>0,w >0.
Let the optimal solution of [BL3] be (x*,y* w*). x* is feasible in the leader's
problem. Moreover, for k sufficiently large, the duality gap must be zero, so we must
have y*e7(x*). Two different algorithms have been suggested to solve [BL3];
Let 0(w) = minfc/x + c2
r
y - k(c3
T
y - w
r(b - Bx)) \Dx < d,Ay + Bx < b,x >
*>y
0,y > 0} then, [BL3] is equivalent to min{#(w) \w TA > c3 ,w > 0}, which is a difficult
w
concave minimization problem. Anandalingam and Apprey (1991) solves this problem
with a successive underestimation method proposed by Falk and Hoffman (1976).
A second way to solve [BL3] is through a "modified simplex algorithm" (Onal
1993), which is a quadratic programming algorithm (Beale 1959) that seems to become
simpler in the special setting of [BL3]. The algorithm maintains a basic feasible solution
and, in each "simplex" iteration, it evaluates the partial derivatives of the objective
function with respect to the non-basic variables (through a relatively complex matrix
calculation). Then, it pivots and chooses the entering variable in the usual way. In each
major iteration, a local optimum might be found, and upper bound (UB) is updated and a
cut, c^x + c2
r
y ^ UB- s , is added to the problem. The problem is re-solved until no
feasible solution is found; then we have an e-optimal global, solution.
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It is not clear whether these two algorithms should be classified as positive or non-
positive. In both algorithms, the primal variables of the leader and the follower are
controlled simultaneously, and this is a positive approach. However, both algorithms
have a "correction" step where only the follower's dual variables are considered. That
might be considered as a follower's step.
5. Complementarity Approach (Judice and Faustino 1992)
The idea of transforming formulation [BL2] into a parametric linear
complementarity problem was suggested by Bialas and Karwan (1984) but their
algorithm isn't guaranteed to converge to an optimal solution (Ben-ayed and Blair 1990).
In 1988, Judice and Faustino suggested a modification that is guaranteed to converge to
an e-optimal solution. The algorithm was tested on random problems with up to 150
constraints and 250 variables, and was shown to have relatively good performance
(Hansen, Jaumard and Savard 1992). However, the performance of the algorithm
degrades significantly when tested on problems with "conflicting" objectives. This is a
clear evidence that the algorithm is positive.
6. Variable Elimination (Hansen, Jaumard and Savard 1992)
This algorithm performs branch-and-bound on the constraints of the follower's
problem. At each node on the enumeration tree, one more of these constraints is forced
to bind and one of the follower's variables is eliminated. Then, the algorithm lets the
leader control the follower's remaining unfixed variables and the leader's problem is
solved to obtain a local lower bound on the leader's optimal solution. This local bound
may not be global because some of the follower's variables have already been set. If this
local lower bound is worse than the bound from a feasible solution, this node can be
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eliminated. The algorithm is implemented using a depth-first search of the enumeration
tree and each time the search reaches a leaf (all follower's variables are set), the leader's
problem is solved, a feasible solution is exposed and the global upper bound on the
follower's optimal solution is updated, if appropriate.
The algorithm was extensively tested on problems with up to 150 constraints and
250 variables. It was shown to be much better than any other tested algorithm, including
branch-and-bound on the KKT complimentary conditions (Bard and Moore 1990) and the
Judice-Faustino algorithm. However, like those two algorithms, certain random
problems require ten times more computational effort than other problems, and sensitivity
to the number of follower variables is observed. Furthermore, a special set of tests
indicates that the running time decreases when the leader's and follower's objective
functions become more similar. Those results indicate that this is a positive algorithm.
Indeed, the lower bound on the follower's objective used for fathoming will rarely be
effective in the min-max case.
7. A Hybrid Tabu-Ascent Heuristic (Gendreau, Marcotte and Savard
1996).
This algorithm attempts to solve BLLP to near-optimal ity by a combination of a
few heuristic methods. After a feasible solution is found, the algorithm iterates between a
local-ascent search and a tabu search. The first technique is used to find an optimum that
might be local, and the second is used to move away from a local optimum, to an area
where a solution better than the last local optimum may exist. When the tabu search fails
to find such an area, the algorithm stops.
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The algorithm was tested and compared to the variable elimination algorithm on a
set of random problems, on an HP730 workstation. The largest problems had 200
variables, 75 constraints and a relatively dense constraint matrix (25% non-zero). On
those problems, the heuristic algorithm used 3-13 minutes of CPU time and found better
solutions than the exact algorithm found after 60 minutes ofCPU time.
Recall that the variable elimination algorithm has significant variation in running
time between problems of the same size, probably because it is a positive algorithm. The
heuristic algorithm has a much more stable running time. Hence, we can guess that the
heuristic is using a non-positive approach.
F. ALGORITHMS FOR THE BLMTP
Only a few papers have been written concerning solution procedures for the bi-
level mixed integer programming (BLMTP).
1. Parameterized integer program (Bard and Moore 1992)
The algorithm works only when both x and y are binary. It works by solving
instances of the following formulation
[BLMTP1] max c3
r
y
s.t. Dx <d
Ay + Bx < b
c
1
r
x + c2
r
y ^ a
xeX,yeY
where a is a parameter, equal to the best objective value found so far less 1. (It is
assumed that all objective coefficients are integer.)
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The algorithm implicitly enumerates the enumeration tree associated with the
variables x. In each iteration, some of those variables are set to or 1 and the remaining
problem is solved as a standard MIP. When the MTP is infeasible, the branch is deleted.
Otherwise, x is fixed and the follower's problem is solved to obtain a feasible solution to
the original problem, [BLMIP]. If the two solutions are the same, there is no need to
develop this branch anymore. Otherwise the enumeration process continues by
restricting x further. The algorithm uses specific branching and backtracking rules that
were optimized with respect to a set of random problems.
Computational results with random problems with up to 45 binary variables were
reported. On average it took 100-150 CPU seconds on an IBM 3081-D to solve problems
with 30 x variables and 15 y variables. Wide variations in the algorithm's running time
and sensitivity to the number of variables under the follower's control were observed.
Both these results are probably because this is a positive algorithm. If we substitute the
LSIP conditions, c 1 = and c3 = -c
,
then [BLMI1] would become almost useless and
the algorithm might enumerate all possible values for x.
2. "Classical" branch-and-bound (Moore and Bard 1990)
The algorithm solves the mixed integer bi-level program similar to the way
branch-and-bound is used to solve MTPs. At every node, a relaxed BLLP is solved and
the enumeration tree is developed and fathomed with appropriate fathoming rules. When
all the leader's variables are continuous, as in LSIP, the three "regular" fathoming rules
(infeasiblity, new integer solution and objective value worse then a known integer
solution) are valid and used in the usual way. When all or part of the follower's variables
are restricted to integer values, the fathoming rules must be modified, however.
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This algorithm' s performance hinges on the sub-algorithm that is used to solve the
relaxed BLLP problems (which are NP-hard.) Originally the algorithm was implemented
with the "BB-KKT algorithm", which is positive, and not appropriate for solving LSIP.
The algorithm could work with other sub-algorithms as well, but, recall that we have
found no non-positive algorithm for BLLP that has been tested on large problems.
3. Binary search algorithm (Wen and Yang 1990)
As in LSIP, this algorithm assumes binary leader variables and continuous
follower variables. However, the algorithm doesn't assume the min-max case, and
allows independent objective functions for the leader and the follower.
The algorithm implicitly examines all possible values of the leader's variables
through a branch-and-bound process. At each node in the enumeration tree, a few of the
leader's variables are set to or 1 and the algorithm uses an LP (which we won't describe
here) to calculate a local lower bound on the leader's objective. This branch is fathomed
if the bound is worse than the best solution value found so far. When all the variables x
have been set to or 1, the follower's problem is solved to obtain a new feasible solution.
The algorithm is positive, and when it's applied to a problem such as system
interdiction, the lower bound from the LP will not be useful at all. Thus, the algorithm
might enumerate all possible values for x. Moreover, even on random problems the
algorithm's performance is poor and the authors suggest using a heuristic, which we
describe next.
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4. Greedy Heuristic (Wen and Yang, 1990)
This heuristic uses a greedy approach. At each iteration, a few of the leader's
variables are set to 1 and the follower's problem is solved, as well as the LP mentioned
above. Based on the dual variables of these solutions, a "judgment index" for the profit
of the leader from setting each one of his variables to 1 is calculated. The variable with
the maximum judgment index is set to 1. The algorithm starts with all the variables equal
to 0. In each iteration, it sets one more variable to 1, and continues until no more
variables can be set without violating feasibility. The heuristic is extremely fast and, on
average, achieves better than a 3% optimality gap when tested on random problems.
However, it is easy to build an example where this simple greedy heuristic will give
arbitrarily bad results.
The heuristic becomes simpler when it applied to LSIP. In every iteration, the
follower's problem is solved with the current set of interdicted activities, the "judgment
index" of interdicting activityj is Uj times the dual variable of the constraint^ < Uj. The
activity with the largest judgement index is interdicted, and the process continuous
recursively.
5. Reducing into BLLP (Vicente, Savard and Judice 1996)
The last algorithm suggested so far for solving BLMIP transforms the problem
into a regular BLLP. It is shown that if (a) y is continuous, (b) x is binary, (c) M is
sufficiently large, and, (d) c
x
< and c2 ^ (without loss of generality), then [BLMIP]
is equivalent to:
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[BLMIP2] min Ci rx + c2 ry + Me
rw
xeX,(y,w)eYW(x)
where X = {x \Dx < d, < x < e}
iw(x) = {(y,w) |(y,w) eargmax c3ry + erw
s.t. Ay<b-Bx
w < x
w < e-x
y ey }
where e is a vector of ones with appropriate dimension.
As with other models using penalty terms, a key problem is to determine how
largeM should be. Vicente et al. suggest solving a sequence of BLLPs for increasing
values of the penalty term. When the optimal solution in the kth iteration has all leader
variables at or 1 we can stop and declare optimality. Otherwise M = Mk is increased to
Mk+1 = (-c lTxk -c2Tyic )/eTw k. , and the non-integer optimal solution of the £th
iteration will give a positive and unattractive objective in the following iteration.
Computational experience has not been reported and it is not clear whether computational
difficulties are expected (due to the large penalty multiplier).
G. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of this appendix is that the existing literature on general
BLLPs does not suggest suitable algorithms for the special structure of LSIP. We
support this statement with the following observations:
(a) Only three exact algorithms (Bard and Moore 1990, Hansen, Jaumard and Savard
1992, Section 16.3.3 in Shimizu, Ishizuka and Bard 1997) have been tested on
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relatively large BLLPs. These algorithms all use a strongly positive approach,
which means that they work better when there is strong correlation between the
leader's and follower's objective functions. Hence, they would probably not be
efficient when applied to min-max problems, like LSIP. Only a few exact
algorithms (Vaish and Shetty 1977, Anandalingam and Apprey 1991, Onal, 1993)
that may use a non-positive approach exist, and none of those has been tested on
large problems.
(b) Existing algorithms for the mixed integer case, BLMEP, are either positive by
themselves (Bard and Moore 1992, Wen and Yang 1990) or are based on a BLLP
algorithm as a subroutine (Moore and Bard 1989, Vicente, Savard and Judice
1996). And, as mentioned above, there are no BLLP algorithms that seem to be
attractive for solving LSIP.
(c) None of the existing algorithms, exact or heuristic, is designed to take advantage
of the special min-max structure of LSIP. Moreover, the algorithms have
typically been tested on "random problems."
We have established that none of the existing algorithms for BLLPs or BLMTPs is
really appropriate for LSIP. Therefore, in Chapters II and Chapter HI, we develop
three new algorithms specially tailored to LSIP. The algorithms definitely exploit the
special structure of LSIP and cannot be applied to a general BLMIP. In Chapter n, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithms on a special-case problem, shortest-path
network interdiction.
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APPENDIX B: THE MORE GENERAL SYSTEM INTERDICTION PROBLEM
Proposition 3.1: When Assumption 3.1 holds, the basic linear system interdiction
[LSIP] min max cry
xeX yeY(x)
where X = jx e {04}"
|
R* < r}, and
Y(x) = {y|,4y<b,0<y<t/(l-x),yeS}
is equivalent to the more general linear system-interdiction problem defined as
[LSIP*] min max cry-xrVy
xeX ye7(x)
where X =[x e{0,l}" ^x < r}, and
Y(x) =[y eR*\Ay <b-Bx,0<y,y eS]
where f/=diag(u), S and S include integer or binary restrictions on elements of
y and y respectively, A eR
kxm
,V gR^"1 ,A eRkxA andBeR^*".
Remarks:
(a) The general case, [LSIP*], allows an interdiction by the leader to affect one or
more of the follower's available resources and/or the availability and cost of the
follower's possible activities.
(b) The restriction that B» > is acceptable, because it is unlikely that an
interdiction will relax any of the system's constraints.
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Proof:
Set A =
A
,
b =
b
,
B =
I u B
and V = [0] . Then, [LSIP] takes the form of
[LSIP*].
For the second direction, we first show how to drop out the non-linear term in the
objective function of [LSIP*]. Let us introduce n new variables, y &R+, and n new
constraints, y > Vy - V(l - x). Set y =
"y"
,
c =
c
,
b =
b
,
A =
A o"
_y_
-1 VI V -/
B =
,
and V = [0] . These new constraints and the unattractive coefficients of y in
the objective function, guarantee that v
;
- = ^F
i
(Vy)j if Xj = 1 (recall that V, ei?Jxm ).
*j =1
Therefore, for every xel the solution of the inner maximization problem stays the
same, and so this transformation doesn't change the optimal solution. We conclude that
we can assume that V = [0]
.
We now show how to rearrange the structure of the constraints in Y(x) . Let us
introduce (kxn + n) new variables, z e R+ and y € R . (Note that z is a vector, not
a matrix.) We add the following constraints: (a) y < 1 - x, and (b) Z«_n^+ j ^ Btj (1
-
Jj)
for i=l,..,k and j=\,..,h . (For simplicity we denote Z^u^+j by z^ .)
m h
„ ^ ** ^.
To finish the construction, the original yth constraint, /.Ajtyi ^ &, - 2^y*./' » ^s
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replaced by zLA^yt < bj - 2^Zy . This replacement changes nothing, because:
7=1 j-1
(a) If activity j is interdicted (Xj = 1), then these constraints and construction set
Jj = and therefore ztj > Btj for /'. However, for every interdiction plan x, there
is an optimal solution with Zy = 5y- for all /, because z only tightens constraints.
(b) In the same way, when activity j is not interdicted (x, = 0), for every interdiction
plan x, there is an optimal solution with zy = for all i.
It is easy to verify that the new construction fits into formulation [LSIP], where
y, y , and z are aggregated into y, and A, U, and b, are defined appropriately.
131
132-
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1
.
Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Klingman Rd., Ste 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-62 18
2. Dudley Knox Library (411 Dyer Rd.) 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
3. Professor R. Kevin Wood Code OR/Wd 10
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
4. Professor Gerald G. Brown Code OR/Bw 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
5. Professor Alan R. Washburn Code OR/Ws 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
6. Adjunct Professor Wayne P. Hughes Code OR/HI 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
7. Professor Harold Fredricksen Code MA/Fr 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
8. Major Eitan Israeli 5
2 Arbel St.
Reu't, Israel, 71908
-133


1 c: 483npg n~\\ t m
10/99 22527-200.-^ if.




